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Abstract
We give some lectures on the work on formal logic of Jacques Herbrand, and
sketch his life and his influence on automated theorem proving. The intended audi-
ence ranges from students interested in logic over historians to logicians. Besides the
well-known correction of Herbrand’s “False Lemma” by Gödel and Dreben, we
also present the hardly known unpublished correction of Heijenoort and its conse-
quences on Herbrand’s Modus Ponens Elimination. Besides Herbrand’s Funda-
mental Theorem and its relation to the Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem, we carefully
investigate Herbrand’s notion of intuitionism in connection with his notion of false-
hood in an infinite domain. We sketch Herbrand’s two proofs of the consistency of
arithmetic and his notion of a recursive function, and last but not least, present the
correct original text of his unification algorithm with a new translation.
Keywords: Jacques Herbrand, History of Logic, Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem,
Modus Ponens Elimination, Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem, Falsehood in an Infinite
Domain, Consistency of Arithmetic, Recursive Functions, Unification Algorithm.
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31 Introductory Lecture
Regarding the work on formal logic of Jacques Herbrand (1908–1931), our following
lectures will provide a lot of useful information for the student interested in logic as well as
a few surprising insights for the experts in the fields of history and logic.
As Jacques Herbrand is an idol of many scholars today, we cannot help asking
ourselves the following questions: Is there still something to learn from his work on logic
which has not found its way into the standard textbooks on logic? Has everything already
been published which should be said or written on him? Should we treat him just as an
icon?
Well, the lives of mathematical prodigies who passed away very early after ground-
breaking work invoke a fascination for later generations: The early death of Niels Henrik
Abel (1802–1829) from ill health after a sled trip to visit his fiancé for Christmas; the
obscure circumstances of Evariste Galois’ (1811–1832) duel; the deaths of consumption
of Gotthold Eisenstein (1823–1852) (who sometimes lectured his few students from
his bedside) and of Gustav Roch (1839–1866) in Venice; the drowning of the topologist
Pavel Samuilovich Urysohn (1898–1924) on vacation; the burial of Raymond Paley
(1907–1933) in an avalanche at Deception Pass in the Rocky Mountains; as well as the
fatal imprisonment of Gerhard Gentzen (1909–1945) in Prague1 — these are tales most
scholars of logic and mathematics have heard in their student days.
Jacques Herbrand, a young prodigy admitted to the École Normale Supérieure as the
best student of the year 1925, when he was 17, died only six years later in a mountaineering
accident in La Bérarde, Isère, France. He left a legacy in logic and mathematics that is
outstanding.
Despite his very short life, Herbrand’s contributions were of great significance at his
time and they had a strong impact on the work by others later in mathematics, proof
theory, computer science, and artificial intelligence. Even today the name “Herbrand”
can be found astonishingly often in research papers in fields that did not even exist at his
time.2
Let us start this introductory lecture by sketching a preliminary list of topics that were
influenced by Herbrand’s work.
1Cf. [Vihan, 1995], [Menzler-Trott, 2001; 2007].
2To wit, the search in any online library (e.g. citeseer) reveals that astonishingly many authors dedicate
parts of their work directly to Jacques Herbrand. A “Google Scholar” search gives a little less than
ten thousand hits and the phrases we find by such an experiment include: Herbrand agent language,
Herbrand analyses, Herbrand automata, Herbrand base, Herbrand complexity, Herbrand con-
straints, Herbrand disjunctions, Herbrand entailment, Herbrand equalities, Herbrand expansion,
Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem, Herbrand functions, Herbrand–Gentzen theorem, Herbrand
interpretation, Herbrand–Kleene universe, Herbrand model, Herbrand normal forms, Herbrand
procedures, Herbrand quotient, Herbrand realizations, Herbrand semantics, Herbrand strategies,
Herbrand terms, Herbrand–Ribet theorem, Herbrand’s theorem, Herbrand theory, Herbrand
universe. Whether and to what extend these references to Herbrand are justified is sometimes open for
debate. This list shows, however, that in addition to the foundational importance of his work at the time,
his insights still have an impact on research even at the present time. Herbrand’s name is therefore not
only frequently mentioned among the most important mathematicians and logicians of the 20th century
but also among the pioneers of modern computer science and artificial intelligence.
41.1 Proof Theory
Dirk van Dalen (*1932) begins his review on [Herbrand, 1971] as follows:
“Much of the logical activity in the first half of this century was inspired by
Hilbert’s program, which contained, besides fundamental reflections on the
nature of mathematics, a number of clear-cut problems for technically gifted
people. In particular the quest for so-called “consistency proofs” was taken up
by quite a number of logicians. Among those, two men can be singled out for
their imaginative approach to logic and mathematics: Jacques Herbrand
and Gerhard Gentzen. Their contributions to this specific area of logic,
called “proof theory” (Beweistheorie) following Hilbert, are so fundamental
that one easily recognizes their stamp in modern proof theory.”3
Dalen continues:
“When we realize that Herbrand’s activity in logic took place in just a few
years, we cannot but recognize him as a giant of proof theory. He discovered
an extremely powerful theorem and experimented with it in proof theory. It
is fruitless to speculate on the possible course Herbrand would have chosen,
had he not died prematurely; a consistency proof for full arithmetic would have
been within his reach.”4
The thesis of [Anellis, 1991] is that, building on the Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem,
it was Herbrand’s work in elaborating Hilbert’s concept of “being a proof” that gave
rise to the development of the variety of first-order calculi in the 1930s, such as the ones
of the Hilbert school, and such as Natural Deduction and Sequent calculi in [Gentzen,
1935].
As will be shown in § 11, Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem has directly influenced
Paul Bernays’ work on proof theory.
The main inspiration in the unwinding program,5 which — to save the merits of proof
theory — Georg Kreisel (*1923) suggested as a replacement for Hilbert’s failed pro-
gram, is Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem, especially forKreisel’s notion of a recursive
interpretation of a logic calculus in another one,6 such as given by Herbrand’s Funda-
mental Theorem for his first-order calculus in the sentential tautologies over the language
enriched with Skolem functions.
Herbrand’s approach to consistency proofs, as we will sketch in §§ 15 and 16, has a
semantical flavor and is inspired by Hilbert’s evaluation method of ε-substitution, whereas
it avoids the dependence on Hilbert’s ε-calculus. The main idea (cf. § 16) is to replace
the induction axiom by recursive functions of finitistic character. Herbrand’s approach is
in contrast to the purely syntactical style of Gentzen7 and Schütte8 in which semantical
interpretation plays no rôle.
3Cf. [Dalen, 1974, p. 544].
4Cf. [Dalen, 1974, p. 548].
5Cf. [Kreisel, 1951; 1952; 1958; 1982], and do not miss the discussion in [Feferman, 1996]!
“To determine the constructive (recursive) content or the constructive equivalent of the non-
constructive concepts and theorems used in mathematics, particularly arithmetic and analysis.”
[Kreisel, 1958, p. 155]
6Cf. [Kreisel, 1958, p. 160] and [Feferman, 1996, p. 259f.].
5So-called Herbrand-style consistency proofs follow Herbrand’s idea of constructing
finite sub-models to imply consistency by Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem. During the
early 1970s, this technique was used by Thomas M. Scanlon Jr. (*1940) in collaboration
with Dreben and Goldfarb.9 These consistency proofs for arithmetic roughly follow
Ackermann’s previous proof,10 but they apply Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem in
advance and consider Skolemized form instead of Hilbert’s ε-terms.11
Gentzen’s and Herbrand’s insight on Cut and modus ponens elimination and the
existence of normal form derivations with mid-sequents had a strong influence onWilliam
Craig’s work on interpolation.12 The impact of Craig’s Interpolation Theorem to various
disciplines in turn has recently been discussed at the Interpolations Conference in Honor of
William Craig in May 2007.13
1.2 Recursive Functions and
Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem
As will be discussed in detail in § 17, in his 1934 Princeton lectures, Gödel introduced
the notion of (general) recursive functions and mentioned that this notion had been pro-
posed to him in a letter from Herbrand, cf. § 2. This letter, however, seems to have
had more influence on Gödel’s thinking, namely on the consequences of Gödel’s second
incompleteness theorem:
“Nowhere in the correspondence does the issue of general computability arise.
Herbrand’s discussion, in particular, is solely trying to explore the limits of
consistency proofs that are imposed by the second theorem. Gödel’s response
also focuses on that very topic. It seems that he subsequently developed a
more critical perspective on the very character and generality of this theorem.”
[Sieg, 2005, p. 180]
Sieg [2005] argues that the letter of Herbrand to Gödel caused a change of Gödel’s
perception of the impact of his own second incompleteness theorem on Hilbert’s program:
Initially Gödel did assert that it would not contradict Hilbert’s viewpoint. Influenced
by Herbrand’s letter, however, he accepted the more critical opinion of Herbrand on
this matter.
7Cf. [Gentzen, 1936; 1938; 1943].
8Cf. [Schütte, 1960].
9Cf. [Dreben & Denton, 1970], [Scanlon, 1973], [Goldfarb & Scanlon, 1974].
10Cf. [Ackermann, 1940].
11Contrary to the proofs of [Dreben & Denton, 1970] and [Ackermann, 1940], the proof of [Scanlon,
1973], which is otherwise similar to the proof of [Dreben & Denton, 1970], admits the inclusion of
induction axioms over any recursive well-ordering on the natural numbers:
By an application of Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem, from a given derivation of an inconsistency,
we can compute a positive natural number n such that Property C of order n holds. Therefore, in his
analog of Hilbert’s and Ackermann’s ε-substitution method, Scanlon can effectively pick a minimal
counterexample on the champ fini Tn from a given critical counterexample, even if this neither has a direct
predecessor nor a finite initial segment.
This result was then further generalized in [Goldfarb & Scanlon, 1974] to ω-consistency of arithmetic.
12Cf. [Craig, 1957a; Craig, 1957b].
13Cf. http://sophos.berkeley.edu/interpolations/.
6“An odd prime p is called irregular if the class number of the field Q(µp) is divisible by p (µp
being, as usual, the group of p-th roots of unity). According to Kummer’s criterion, p is irregular
if and only if there exists an even integer k with 2 ≤ k ≤ p− 3 such that p divides (the numerator
of) k-th Bernoulli number Bk, given by the expansion
t
et − 1
+
t
2
− 1 =
∑
n≥2
Bn
n!
tn.
The purpose of this paper is to strengthen Kummer’s criterion.
Let A be the ideal class group of Q(µp), and let C be the Fp-vector space A/A
p. The Galois
group Gal(Q/Q) acts on C through its quotient ∆ = Gal(Q(µp)/Q). Since all characters of ∆
with values in F
∗
p are powers of the standard character
χ : Gal(Q/Q)→ ∆−˜→F∗p
giving the action of Gal(Q/Q) on µp, the vector space C has a canonical decomposition
C =
⊕
i mod (p−1)
C(χi),
where
C(χi) = {c ∈ C|σc = χi(σ) c for all σ ∈ ∆}.
(1.1) Main Theorem.
Let k be even, 2 ≤ k ≤ p− 3.
Then p|Bk if and only if C(χ
1−k) 6= 0
In fact, the statement that C(χ1−k) 6= 0 implies p|Bk is well known [Herbrand, 1932b, Th. 3]”
[Ribet, 1976, Theorem1.1, p. 151]
Figure 1: Herbrand–Ribet Theorem
1.3 Algebra and Ring Theory
In 1930–1931, within a few months, Herbrand wrote several papers on algebra and ring
theory. During his visit to Germany he met and briefly worked on this topic withNoether,
Hasse, and Artin; cf. § 2. He contributed several new theorems of his own and simplified
proofs of results by Leopold Kronecker (1823–1891), Heinrich Weber (1842–1913),
Teiji Takagi (1875–1960), Hilbert, and Artin, thereby generalizing some of these re-
sults. The Herbrand–Ribet Theorem is a result on the class number of certain number
fields and it strengthens Kummer’s convergence criterion; cf. Figure 1.
7Note that there is no direct connection between Herbrand’s work on logic and his work
on algebra. Useful applications of proof theory to mathematics are very rare. Kreisel’s
“unwinding” of Artin’s proof of Artin’s Theorem into a constructive proof seems to be
one of the few exceptions.14
1.4 A first résumé
Our following lectures will be more self-contained than this introductory lecture. But
already on the basis of this first overview, we just have to admit that Jacques Herbrand’s
merits are so outstanding that he has no chance to escape idolization. Actually, he has left
a world heritage in logic in a very short time. But does this mean that we should treat
him just as an icon?
On a more careful look, we will find out that this genius had his flaws, just as everybody
of us made of this strange protoplasmic variant of matter, and that he has left some of them
in his scientific writings. And he can teach us not only to be less afraid of logic than of
mountaineering; he can also provide us with a surprising amount of insight that partly still
lies to be rescued from contortion in praise and faulty quotations.
1.5 Still ten minutes to go
Inevitably, when all introductory words are said, we will feel the urge to point out to the
young students that there are things beyond the latest developments of computer technology
or the fabric of the Internet: eternal truths valid on planet Earth but in all those far away
galaxies just as well.
And as there are still ten minutes to go till the end of the lecture, the students listen
in surprise to the strange tale about the unknown flying objects from the far away, now
visiting planet Earth and being welcomed by a party of human dignitaries from all strata
of society. Not knowing what to make of all this, the little green visitors will ponder the
state of evolution on this strange but beautiful planet: obviously life is there — but can it
think?
The Earthlings seem to have flying machines, they are all connected planet-wide by
communicators — but can they really think? Their gadgets and little pieces of machinery
appear impressive — but is there a true civilization on planet Earth? How dangerous are
they, these Earthlings made of a strange protoplasmic variant of matter?
14With Artin’s Theorem we mean:
“Eine rationale Funktion F (x1, x2, · · · , xn) von n Veränderlichen heiße definit, wenn sie für
kein reelles Wertsystem der xi negative Werte annimmt.” [Artin, 1927, p. 100]
“Satz 4: Es sei R ein reeller Zahlkörper, der sich nur auf eine Weise ordnen lässt, wie zum
Beispiel der Körper der rationalen Zahlen, oder der aller reellen algebraischen Zahlen oder
der aller reellen Zahlen.
Dann ist jede rationale definite Funktion von x1, x2, · · · , xn mit Koëffizienten aus R
Summe von Quadraten von rationalen Funktionen der xi mit Koëffizienten aus R.”
[Artin, 1927, p. 109, modernized orthography]
Cf. [Delzell, 1996] for the unwinding of Artin’s proof of Artin’s Theorem.
Cf. [Feferman, 1996] for a discussion of the application of proof theory to mathematics in general.
8And then cautiously looking through the electronic windows of their flying unknown
objects, they notice that strange little bearded Earthling, being pushed into the back by
the more powerful dignitaries, who holds up a sign post with
|= ≡ ⊢
written on it.
Blank faces, not knowing what to make of all this, the oldest and wisest scientist is slowly
moved out through the e-door of the flying object, slowly being put down to the ground,
and now the bearded Earthling is asked to come forward and the two begin that cosmic
debate about syntax and semantics, proof theory and model theory, while the dignitaries
stay stunned and silent.
And soon there is a sudden flash of recognition and a warm smile on that green and
wrinkled old face, who has seen it all and now waves back to his fellow travelers who
remained safely within the flying object: “Yes, they have minds — yes oh yes!”
And this is why the name “Jacques Herbrand” is finally written among others with
a piece of chalk onto the blackboard — and now that the introductory lecture is coming to
a close, we promise to tell in the following lectures, what this name stands for and what
that young scientist found out when he was only 21 years old.
92 Herbrand’s Life
He was born on Feb. 12, 1908, in Paris, France, where his father, Jacques Herbrand
Sr., worked as a trader in antique paintings.15
His parents were of Belgian origin.
He died — 23 years old — in a mountaineering accident on July 27, 1931, in La Bérarde,
Isère, France.
He remained the only child of his parents. —
This brief résumé of Jacques Herbrand’s life focuses on his entourage and the people
he met.16 All in all, very little is known about his personality and life.
In 1925, only 17 years old, he was ranked first at the entrance examination to the
prestigious École Normale Supérieure (ENS )17 in Paris — but he showed little interest for
the standard courses at the Sorbonne, which he considered a waste of time.15 However, he
closely followed the famous “Séminaire Hadamard” at the Collège de France, organized
by Jacques Salomon Hadamard (1865–1963) from 1913 until 1933.18 That seminar
attracted many students. At Herbrand’s time, among these students, prominent in their
later lives, were:
name lifetime year of entering the ENS
André Weil (1906–1998) 1922
Jean Dieudonné (1906–1992) 1924
Jacques Herbrand (1908–1931) 1925
Albert Lautman (1908–1944) 1926
Claude Chevalley (1909–1984) 1926
Weil, Dieudonné, and Chevalley would later be known among the eight founding
members of the renowned Bourbaki group: the French mathematicians who published
the book series on the formalization of mathematics, starting with [Bourbaki, 1939ff.].
15Cf. [Chevalley, 1982].
16More complete accounts of Herbrand’s life and personality can be found in [Chevalley, 1935; 1982],
[Chevalley & Lautman, 1931], [Gödel, 1986ff., Vol. V, pp. 3–25].
17Cf. http://www.ens.fr for the ENS in general and http://www.archicubes.ens.fr for the former
students of the ENS.
18Cf. [Cartwright, 1965, p. 82], [Dieudonné, 1999, p. 107].
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Weil, Lautman, and Chevalley were Herbrand’s friends. Chevalley and
Herbrand became particularly close friends19 and they worked together on algebra.20
Chevalley depictsHerbrand as an adventurous, passionate, and often perfectionistic
personality who was not only interested in mathematics, but also in poetry and sports.15
In particular, he seemed to have liked extreme sportive challenges: mountaineering, hiking,
and long distance swimming. His interest in philosophical issues and foundational problems
of science was developed well beyond his age.
At that time, the ENS did not award a diploma, but the students had to prepare the
agrégation, an examination necessary to be promoted to professeur agrégé,21 even though
most students engaged into research.
Herbrand passed the agrégation in 1928, again ranked first, and he prepared his doc-
toral thesis under the direction of Ernest Vessiot (1865–1952), who was the director of
the ENS since 1927.22
Herbrand submitted his thesis [Herbrand, 1930], entitled Recherches sur la théorie
de la démonstration, on April 14, 1929. It was approved for publication on June 20, 1929.
In October 1929, he had to join the army for his military service which lasted for one
year in those days.
He finally defended his thesis on June 11, 1930. One reason for the late defense is that
because of the minor rôle mathematical logic played at that time in France, Herbrand’s
supervisor Ernest Vessiot had problems finding examiners for the thesis. The final
committee consisted of Ernest Vessiot, Arnaud Denjoy (1884–1974) and Maurice
René Fréchet (1878–1973).
After completing his military service in September 1930, awarded with a Rockefeller
Scholarship, he spent the academic year 1930–1931 in Germany and planned to stay in
Princeton23 for the year after.
19Catherine Chevalley, the daughter of Claude Chevalley has written to Peter Roquette on
Herbrand: “he was maybe my father’s dearest friend” [Roquette, 2000, p. 36, Note 44].
20Cf. [Chevalley & Herbrand, 1931] and [Herbrand & Chevalley, 1931].
21This corresponds to a high-school teacher. The original rôle of the ENS was to educate students to
become high-school teachers. Also Jean-Paul Sartre started his career like this.
22It is interesting to note that Ernest Vessiot and Jacques Salomon Hadamard where the two
top-ranked students at the examination for the ENS in 1884.
23Cf. [Gödel, 1986ff., Vol. V, p. 3f.]. Cf. [Roquette, 2013] for the letters between Hasse, Herbrand,
and J. H. M. Wedderburn (1882–1948) (Princeton) on Herbrand’s visit to Princeton.
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Herbrand visited the following mathematicians:
hosting scientist lifetime place time of Herbrand’s stay
John von Neumann
Emil Artin
Emmy Noether24
(1903–1957)
(1898–1962)
(1882–1935)
Berlin
Hamburg
Göttingen
{
{
{
Oct. 20, 1930 25
middle of May 193126
middle of June 1931
middle of July 193127
Herbrand discussed his ideas with Paul Bernays (1888–1977) in Berlin, and he met
Paul Bernays, David Hilbert (1862–1943), and Richard Courant (1988–1972) later
in Göttingen.28
On April 7, 1931, Herbrand wrote a letter to Kurt Gödel (1906–1978), who an-
swered with some delay on July 25, most probably too late for the letter to reachHerbrand
before his early death two days later.29
In other words, although Jacques Herbrand was still a relatively unknown young
scientist, he was well connected to the best mathematicians and logicians of his time,
particularly to those interested in the foundations of mathematics. —
Herbrand met Helmut Hasse (1898–1979) at the Schiefkörper-Kongress (Feb. 26 –
March 1, 1931) in Marburg, and he wrote six letters including plenty of mathema-
tical ideas to Hasse afterward.30 After exchanging several compassionate letters with
Herbrand’s father,31 Hasse wrote Herbrand’s obituary which is printed as the fore-
word to Herbrand’s article on the consistency of arithmetic [Herbrand, 1932a].
24Herbrand had met Noether already very early in 1931 in Halle an der Saale. Cf. [Lemmermeyer
& Roquette, 2006, p.106, Note 10].
25See Note 27 for the not completely reliable source of this date. The following sentence fromHerbrand’s
letter to Claude Chevalley of December 3, 1930, however, may indicate that he arrived in Berlin not
before middle of November (cf. [Gödel, 1986ff., Vol. V, p. 4, Note i]):
“Les mathématiciens sont une bien bizarre chose; voici une quinzaine de jours que chaque fois
que je vois Neumann nous causons d’un travail d’un certain Gödel, qui a fabriqué de bien
curieuses fonctions; et tout cela détruit quelques notions solidement ancreés.”
26The third letter of Herbrand to Hasse is dated May 18, 1931, in Hamburg; cf. [Roquette, 2013].
27In his report to the Rockefeller Foundation, Herbrand wrote that his stay in Germany lasted from
Oct. 20, 1930, until the end of July 1931, which is unlikely because he died on July 27, 1931, in France, and
because Herbrand’s sixth letter to Hasse is dated July 23, 1931, in Paris, France, cf. [Roquette, 2013].
According to [Dubreil, 1983, p.73], Herbrand stayed in Göttingen until the beginning of July 1931.
28That Herbrand met Bernays, Hilbert, and Courant in Göttingen is most likely, but we cannot
document it. Hilbert was still lecturing regularly in 1931, cf. [Reid, 1970, p.199]. Courant wrote a
letter to Herbrand’s father, cf. [Herbrand, 1971, p. 25, Note 1].
29Cf. [Gödel, 1986ff., Vol. V, pp. 3–25].
30Cf. [Roquette, 2013].
31Cf. [Hasse & Herbrand Sr., 1931].
12
3 Finitistic Proof Theory of Classical First-Order Logic
Herbrand’s work on logic falls into the area of what is called proof theory today. More
specifically, he is concerned with the finitistic analysis of two-valued (i.e. classical), first-
order logic and its relationship to sentential, i.e. propositional logic.
Over the millennia, logic developed as proof theory. A key observation of the ancient
Greek schools is that certain patterns of reasoning are valid irrespective of their actual deno-
tation. From “all men are mortal” and “Socrates is a man” we can conclude that “Socrates
is mortal” — irrespective of Socrates’ most interesting personality and the contentious
meaning of “being mortal” in this and other possible worlds. The discovery of patterns
of reasoning, such as these syllogisms, where meaningless symbols can be used instead of
everyday words, was the starting point of the known history of logic in the ancient world.
For over two millennia, the development of these rules for drawing conclusions from given
assumptions just on the basis of their syntactical form was the main subject of logic.
Model theory — on the other hand — the study of formal languages and their inter-
pretation, became a respectable way of logical reasoning through the seminal works of
Leopold Löwenheim (1878–1957) and Alfred Tarski (1901–1983). Accepting the
actual infinite, model theory considers the set-theoretic semantical structures of a given
language. With Tarski’s work, the relationship between these two areas of logic as-
sumed overwhelming importance — as captured in our little anecdote of the introductory
lecture (§ 1.5), where ‘|=’ signifies model-theoretic validity and ‘⊢’ denotes proof-theoretic
derivability.32
Herbrand’s scientific work coincided with the maturation of modern logic, as marked
inter alia by Gödel’s incompleteness theorems of 1930–1931.33 It was strongly influenced
by the foundational crisis in mathematics as well. Russell’s Paradox was not only a per-
sonal calamity to Gottlob Frege (1848–1925),34 but it jeopardized the whole enterprise
of set theory and thus the foundation of modern mathematics. From an epistemological
point of view, maybe there was less reason for getting scared as it appeared at the time:
As Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) reasoned later,35 the detection of inconsistencies
is an inevitable element of human learning, and many logicians today would be happy to
live at such an interesting time of a raging36 foundational crisis.
32As we will discuss in § 14, Jacques Herbrand still had problems in telling ‘⊢’ and ‘|=’ apart: For
instance, he blamed Löwenheim for not showing consistency of first-order logic, which is a property related
to Herbrand’s ‘⊢’, but not to Löwenheim’s ‘|=’.
33Cf. [Gödel, 1931], [Rosser, 1936]. For an interesting discussion of the reception of the incompleteness
theorems cf. [Dawson, 1991].
34Cf. [Frege, 1893/1903, Vol. II].
35Cf. e.g. [Diamond, 1976].
36This crisis has actually never been resolved in the sense that we would have a single set theory that
suits all the needs of a working mathematician.
“Early twentieth century mathematicians used the expression ‘The Crisis in Foundations’.
This crisis had many causes and — despite the disappearance of the expression from contem-
porary speech — has never really been resolved. One of its many causes was the increasing
formalisation of mathematics, which brought with it the realisation that the paradox of the
liar could infect even mathematics itself. This appears most simply in the form of Russell’s
paradox, appropriately in the heart of set theory.” [Forster, 1997, p. 838]
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The development of mathematics, however, more often than not attracts the intelligent
young men looking for clarity and reliability in a puzzling world, threatened by social
complexity. As David Hilbert put it:
“Und wo sonst soll Sicherheit und Wahrheit zu finden sein, wenn sogar das
mathematische Denken versagt?”37
“Es bildet ja gerade einen Hauptreiz bei der Beschäftigung mit einem mathe-
matischen Problem, dass wir in uns den steten Zuruf hören: da ist ein Problem,
suche die Lösung; du kannst sie durch reines Denken finden; denn in der Mathe-
matik gibt es kein Ignorabimus.”38
Furthermore, Hilbert did not want to surrender to the new “intuitionistic” movements
of L. E. J. Brouwer (1881–1966) and Hermann Weyl (1885–1955), who suggested a
restructuring of mathematics with emphasis on the problems of existence and consistency
rather than elegance, giving up many previous achievements, especially in analysis and in
the set theory of Georg Cantor (1845–1918):39
“Aus dem Paradies, das uns Cantor geschaffen, soll uns niemand vertreiben.”40
Building on the works of Richard Dedekind (1831–1916), Charles S. Peirce (1839–
1914), Ernst Schröder (1841–1902), Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), and Guiseppe
Peano (1858–1932), the celebrated three volumes of Principia Mathematica [Whitehead
& Russell, 1910–1913] of Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) and Bertrand
Russell (1872–1970) had provided evidence that — in principle — mathematical proofs
could be reduced to logic, using only a few rules of inference and appropriate axioms.
The goals of Hilbert’s program on the foundation of mathematics, however, extended
well beyond this: His contention was that the reduction of mathematics to formal theories
of logical calculi would be insufficient to resolve the foundational crisis of mathematics,
neither would it protect against Russell’s Paradox and other inconsistencies in the future
— unless the consistency of these theories could be shown formally by simple means.
Let us elaborate on what was meant by these “simple means”.
37Cf. [Hilbert, 1926, p.170].
“And where else are security and truth to be found, if even mathematical thinking fails?”
38Cf. [Hilbert, 1926, p.180, modernized orthography].
“After all, one of the things that attract us most when we apply ourselves to a mathematical
problem is precisely that within us we always hear the call: here is a problem, search for
the solution; you can find it by pure thought, for in mathematics there is no ignorabimus.”
[Heijenoort, 1971a, p. 384, translation by Stefan Bauer-Mengelberg]
39Cf. [Brouwer, 1925a; 1925b; 1926], [Weyl, 1921; 1928], [Cantor, 1932].
40Cf. [Hilbert, 1926, p.170].
“No one shall drive us from the paradise Cantor has created.”
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Until he moved to Göttingen, Hilbert lived in Königsberg, and his view on mathema-
tics in the 1920s was partly influenced byKant’s Critique of pure reason.41 Mathematics as
directly and intuitionally perceived by a mathematician is called contentual44 (inhaltlich)
by Hilbert. According to [Hilbert, 1926], the notions and methods of contentual
mathematics are partly abstracted from finite symbolic structures (such as explicitly and
concretely given natural numbers, proofs, and algorithms) where we can effectively decide
(in finitely many effective steps) whether a given object has a certain property or not. Be-
yond these aposterioristic abstractions from phenomena, contentual mathematics also has
a synthetic45 aprioristic46 aspect, which depends neither on experience nor on deduction,
and which cannot be reduced to logic, but which is transcendentally related to intuitive
conceptions. Or, as Hilbert put it:
“SchonKant hat gelehrt – und zwar bildet dies einen integrierenden Bestandteil
seiner Lehre –, dass die Mathematik über einen unabhängig von aller Logik ge-
sicherten Inhalt verfügt und daher nie und nimmer allein durch Logik begrün-
det werden kann, weshalb auch die Bestrebungen von Frege und Dedekind
scheitern mussten. Vielmehr ist als Vorbedingung für die Anwendung logi-
scher Schlüsse und für die Betätigung logischer Operationen schon etwas in der
Vorstellung gegeben: gewisse, außer-logische konkrete Objekte, die anschaulich
als unmittelbares Erlebnis vor allem Denken da sind.”47
41The transcendental philosophy of pure speculative42 reason is developed in the main work on episte-
mology, the Critique of pure reason [Kant, 1781; 1787], of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who spent most
of his life in Königsberg and strongly influenced the education at Hilbert’s high school and university in
Königsberg. The Critique of pure reason elaborates how little we can know about things independent of
an observer (things in themselves, Dinge an sich selbst) in comparison to our conceptions, i.e. the repre-
sentations of the things within our thinking (Erscheinungen und sinnliche Anschauungen, Vorstellungen).
In what he compared43 to the Kopernikan revolution [Kant, 1787, p.XVI], Kant considered the concep-
tions gained in connection with sensual experience to be real and partly objectifiable, and accepted the
things in themselves only as limits of our thinking, about which nothing can be known for certain.
42The term “pure (speculative) reason” is opposed to “(pure) practical reason”.
43Contrary to what is often written, Kant never wrote of “his Kopernikan revolution of philosophy”.
44The word “contentual” did not use to be part of the English language until recently. For instance,
it is not listed in the most complete Webster’s [Gove, 1993]. According to [Heijenoort, 1971a, p. viii],
this neologism was introduced by Stefan Bauer-Mengelberg as a translation for the word “inhaltlich”
in German texts on mathematics and logic, because there was no other way to reflect the special intentions
of the Hilbert school when using this word. In January 2008, “contentual” got 6350 Google hits, 5600 of
which, however, contain neither the word “Hilbert” nor the word “Bernays”. As these hits also include
a pop song, “contentual” is likely to become an English word outside science in the nearer future. For a
comparison, there were 4million Google hits for “contentious”.
45“synthetic” is the opposite of “analytic” and means that a statement provides new information that can-
not be deduced from a given knowledge base. Contrary to Kant’s opinion that all mathematical theorems
are synthetic [Kant, 1787, p.14], (contentual) mathematics also has analytic sentences. In particular,
Kant’s example 7 + 5 = 12 becomes analytic when we read it as s7(0)+ s5(0) = s12(0) and assume the
non-necessary, synthetic, aprioristic axioms x+ 0 = x and x+ s(y) = s(x+ y). Cf. [Frege, 1884, § 89].
46“a priori” is the opposite of “a posteriori” and means that a statement does not depend on any form of
experience. For instance, all necessary [Kant, 1787, p. 3] and all analytic [Kant, 1787, p.11] statements
are a priori. Finally, Kant additionally assumes that all aprioristic statements are necessary [Kant, 1787,
p. 219], which seems to be wrong, cf. Note 45.
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To refer to intellectual concepts which are not directly related to sensual perception or
intuitive conceptions, both Kant and Hilbert use the word “ideal”. Ideal objects and
methods in mathematics — as opposed to contentual ones — may involve the actual infinite;
such as quantification, ε-binding, set theory, and non-terminating computations.
According to both [Kant, 1787] and [Hilbert, 1926], the only possible criteria for the
acceptance of ideal notions are consistency and usefulness. Contrary to Kant,50 however,
Hilbert is willing to accept useful ideal theories, provided that their consistency can be
shown with contentual and intuitively clear methods — i.e. with “simple means”.
These “simple means” that may be admitted here must be, on the one hand, sufficiently
expressive and powerful to show the consistency of arithmetic, but, on the other hand,
simple, i.e. intuitively clear and contentually reliable. The notion of Hilbert’s finitism
was born out of the conflict of these two goals.
Moreover, Hilbert expresses the hope that the new proof theory, primarily developed
to show the consistency of ideal mathematics with contentual means, would also admit
(possibly ideal, i.e. non-finitistic) proofs of completeness51 for certain mathematical theories.
If this goal of Hilbert’s program had been achieved, then ideal proofs would have been
justified as convenient short-cuts for constructive, contentual, and intuitively clear proofs,
and — even under the threat of Russell’s Paradox and others — there would be no reason
to give up the paradise of axiomatic mathematics and abstract set theory.
And these basic convictions of the Hilbert school constituted the most important
influence on the young student of mathematics Jacques Herbrand.
47Cf. [Hilbert, 1926, p.170f., modernized orthography].
“Kant already taught — and indeed it is part and parcel of his doctrine — that mathematics
has at its disposal a content secured independently of all logic and hence can never be provided
with a foundation by means of logic alone; that is why the efforts of Frege and Dedekind
were bound to fail. Rather, as a condition for the use of logical inferences and the performance
of logical operations, something must already be given to our faculty of representation, certain
extra-logical concrete objects that are intuitively present as immediate conceptions prior to
all thought.”
[Heijenoort, 1971a, p. 376, transl. by Stefan Bauer-Mengelberg, modified48]
49We have replaced “extralogical” with “extra-logical”, and — more importantly — “experience” with
“conception”, for the following reason: Contrary to “Erfahrung” (experience), the German word “Erlebnis”
does not suggest an aposterioristic intention, which would contradict the obviously aprioristic intention of
Hilbert’s sentence.
50Kant considers ideal notions to be problematic, because they transcend what he considers to be the
area of objective reality; cf. Note 41. For notions that are consistent, useful, and ideal, Kant actually
introduces the technical term problematic (problematisch):
“Ich nenne einen Begriff problematisch, der keinen Widerspruch enthält, der auch als eine
Begrenzung gegebener Begriffe mit anderen Erkenntnissen zusammenhängt, dessen objektive
Realität aber auf keine Weise erkannt werden kann.”
[Kant, 1787, p. 310, modernized orthography]
51A theory is complete if for any formula A without free variables (i.e. any closed formula in the given
language) which is not part of this theory, its negation ¬A is part of this theory.
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As Gödel showed with his famous incompleteness theorems in 1930–1931,33 however,
the consistency of any (reasonably conceivable) recursively enumerable mathematical theory
that includes arithmetic excludes both its completeness and the existence of a finitistic
consistency proof.
Nevertheless, the contributions of Wilhelm Ackermann (1896–1962), Bernays,
Herbrand, and Gentzen within Hilbert’s program gave proof theory a new meaning as
a field in which proofs are the objects and their properties and constructive transformations
are the field of mathematical study, just as in arithmetic the numbers are the objects and
their properties and algorithms are the field of study.
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4 Herbrand’s Main Contributions to Logic and
his Notion of Intuitionism
The essential works of Herbrand on logic are his PhD thesis [Herbrand, 1930] and the
subsequent journal article [Herbrand, 1932a], both to be found in [Herbrand, 1971].52
The main contribution is captured in what is called today Herbrand’s Fundamental
Theorem. Sometimes it is simply called “Herbrand’s Theorem”, but the longer name is
preferable as there are other important “Herbrand theorems”, such as the Herbrand–
Ribet Theorem. Moreover, Herbrand himself calls it “Théorème fondamental”.
The subject of Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem is the effective reduction of (the
semi-decision problem of) provability in first-order logic to provability in sentential logic.
Here we use the distinction well-known to Herbrand and his contemporaries between
first-order logic (where quantifiers bind variables ranging over individual objects of the
universe, i.e. of the domain of reasoning or discourse) and sentential logic without any
quantifiers. Validity of a formula in sentential logic is effectively decidable, for instance
with the truth-table method.
Although Herbrand spends Chapter 1 of his thesis on the subject, he actually “shows
no interest for the sentential work” [Heijenoort, 1986c, p.120], and takes it for granted.
A. Contrary to Gentzen’s Hauptsatz [Gentzen, 1935], Herbrand’s Fundamental
Theorem starts right with a single sentential tautology (cf. § 9 below). He treats this
property as given and does not fix a concrete method for establishing it.
B. The way Herbrand presents his sentential logic in terms of ‘¬’ and ‘∨’ indicates
that he is not concerned with intuitionistic logic as we understand the term today.53
Contrary to Gentzen’s sequent calculus LK [Gentzen, 1935], in Herbrand’s calculi
we do not find something like a sub-calculus LJ for intuitionistic logic. Moreover, there
is no way to generalize Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem to include intuitionistic logic:
Contrary to the Cut elimination in Gentzen’s Hauptsatz, the elimination of modus ponens
according to Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem does not hold for intuitionistic logic.
“All the attempts to generalize Herbrand’s theorem in that direction have
only led to partial and unhandy results (see [Heijenoort, 1971b]).”
[Heijenoort, 1986c, p.120f.]
52This book is not just an English translation of Herbrand’s complete works on logic: It contains addi-
tional annotation, brief introductions, and extended notes by Jean van Heijenoort, Burton Dreben,
and Warren Goldfarb. This edition is still an excellent source on Herbrand’s writings today, but it
is problematic because it is based on the contorted reprint [Herbrand, 1968]. This means that it ur-
gently needs a corrected edition based on the original editions of Herbrand’s logical writings, which are
all in French and which should be included in facsimile to avoid future contortion. We would appreciate
to include also Herbrand’s mathematical writings outside of logic; some remarks on the two corrections
of Herbrand’s “False Lemma” by Gödel and Heijenoort, respectively, cf. §§ 11 and 12 below; and
Herbrand’s correspondence. The correspondence with Gödel is published in [Gödel, 1986ff., Vol. V,
pp. 14–25]. Herbrand’s letters to Hasse are published in [Roquette, 2013]. The whereabouts of the
rest of his correspondence is unknown.
53Cf. e.g. [Heyting, 1930a; 1971], [Gentzen, 1935].
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When Herbrand uses the term “intuitionism”, this typically should be understood as refer-
ring to something closer to the finitism of Hilbert than to the intuitionism of Brouwer.54
This ambiguous usage of the term “intuitionism” — centered around the partial rejection
of the Law of the Excluded Middle, the actual infinite, as well as quantifiers and other
binders — was common in the Hilbert school at Herbrand’s time.55 Herbrand’s
view on what he calls “intuitionism” is best captured in the following quote:
“Nous entendons par raisonnement intuitionniste, un raisonnement qui satisfait
aux conditions suivantes: on n’y considère jamais qu’un nombre fini déterminé
d’objets et de fonctions; celles-ci sont bien définies, leur définition permettant de
calculer leur valeur d’une manière univoque; on n’affirme jamais l’existence d’un
objet sans donner le moyen de le construire; on n’y considère jamais l’ensemble
de tous les objets x d’une collection infinie; et quand on dit qu’un raisonnement
(ou un théorème) est vrai pour tous ces x, cela signifie que pour chaque x pris en
particulier, il est possible de répéter le raisonnement général en question qui ne
doit être considéré que comme le prototype de ces raisonnements particuliers.”56
Contrary to today’s precise meaning of the term “intuitionistic logic”, the terms “intuition-
ism” and “finitism” denote slightly different concepts, which are related to the philosophical
background, differ from person to person, and vary over times.57
54Gödel, however, expressed a different opinion in a letter to Heijenoort of Sept. 18, 1964:
“In Note 3 of [Herbrand, 1932a] he does not require the enumerability of mathematical
objects, and gives a definition which fits Brouwer’s intuitionism very well”
[Gödel, 1986ff., Vol. V, p. 319f.]
55Cf. e.g. [Herbrand, 1971, p. 283f.], [Tait, 2006, p. 82ff.].
56Cf. [Herbrand, 1932a, p. 3, Note 3]. Without the comma after “intuitionniste”, but with an additional
comma after “question” also in: [Herbrand, 1968, p. 225, Note 3].
“By an intuitionistic argument we understand an argument satisfying the following conditions:
in it we never consider anything but a given finite number of objects and of functions; these
functions are well-defined, their definition allowing the computation of their value in a univocal
way; we never state that an object exists without giving the means of constructing it; we never
consider the totality of all the objects x of an infinite collection; and when we say that an
argument (or a theorem) is true for all these x, we mean that, for each x taken by itself, it is
possible to repeat the general argument in question, which should be considered to be merely
the prototype of the particular arguments.”
[Herbrand, 1971, Note 5, p. 288f., translation by Heijenoort]
57Regarding intuitionism, besides Brouwer,Weyl, andHilbert, we may count Leopold Kronecker
(1823–1891) and Henri Poincaré (1854–1912) among the ancestors, and have to mention Arend
Heyting (1898–1980) for his major differing view, cf. e.g. [Heyting, 1930a; 1930b; 1971]. Deeper dis-
cussions of Herbrand’s notion of “intuitionism” can be found in [Heijenoort, 1986c, pp. 113–118] and in
[Tait, 2006, p. 82ff.]. Moreover, we briefly discuss it in Note 140. For more on finitism cf. e.g. [Parsons,
1998], [Tait, 1981], [Zach, 2001]. For more on Herbrand’s background in philosophy of mathematics,
cf. [Chevalley, 1935], [Dubucs & Égré, 2006].
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While Herbrand is not concerned with intuitionistic logic, he is a finitist with respect
to the following two aspects:
1. Herbrand’s work is strictly contained within Hilbert’s finitistic program and he
puts ample emphasis on his finitistic standpoint and the finitistic character of his
theorems.
2. Herbrand does not accept any model-theoretic semantics unless the models are
finite. In this respect, Herbrand is more finitistic than Hilbert, who demanded
finitism only for consistency proofs.
“Herbrand’s negative view of set theory leads him to take, on certain
questions, a stricter attitude than Hilbert and his collaborators. He
is more royalist than the king. Hilbert’s metamathematics has as its
main goal to establish the consistency of certain branches of mathematics
and thus to justify them; there, one had to restrict himself to finitistic
methods. But in logical investigations other than the consistency problem
of mathematical theories the Hilbert school was ready to work with set-
theoretic notions.” [Heijenoort, 1986c, p.118]
5 The Context of Herbrand’s Work on Logic
Let us now have a look at what was known in Herbrand’s time and at the papers that
influenced his work on logic.
Stanisław Zaremba (1863–1942) is mentioned in [Herbrand, 1928], whereHerbrand
cites Zaremba’s textbook on mathematical logic [Zaremba, 1926], which clearly influ-
enced Herbrand’s notation.58
Herbrand’s subject, first-order logic, became a field of special interest not least because
of the seminal paper [Löwenheim, 1915], which singled out first-order logic in the Theory
of Relatives developed by Peirce and Schröder.59 With this paper, first-order logic
became an area of special interest, because of the surprising metamathematical properties
of this logic, which was intended to be an especially useful tool with a restricted area of
application.60
58Cf. Goldfarb’s Note to [Herbrand, 1928] on p. 32ff. in [Herbrand, 1971]. Zaremba was one of
the leading Polish mathematicians in the 1920s. He had close connections to Paris, but we do not know
whether Herbrand ever met him.
59For the heritage of Peirce cf. [Peirce, 1885], [Brady, 2000]; for that of Schröder cf. [Schröder,
1895], [Brady, 2000], [Peckhaus, 2004].
60Without set theory, first-order logic was too poor to serve as such a single universal logic as the ones
for which Frege, Peano, and Russell had been searching; cf. [Heijenoort, 1986a]. For the suggestion
of first-order logic as the basis for set theory, we should mention [Skolem, 1923b], which is sometimes cited
as of the year 1922, and therefore easily confused with [Skolem, 1923a]. For the emergence of first-order
logic as the basis for mathematics see [Moore, 1987].
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As the presentation in [Löwenheim, 1915] is opaque, Thoralf Skolem (1887–1963)
wrote five clarifying papers contributing to the substance of Löwenheim’s Satz 2, the
now famous Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem [Skolem, 1920; 1923b; 1928; 1929; 1941].
From these papers, Herbrand cites [Löwenheim, 1915] and [Skolem, 1920], and the
controversy pro and contra Herbrand’s reading of [Skolem, 1923b] and [Skolem, 1928]
will be presented in § 14 below.
While Herbrand neither cites Peano nor even mentions Frege, the Principia Mathe-
matica [Whitehead & Russell, 1910–1913] were influential at his time, and he was well
aware of this. Herbrand cites all editions of the Principia and there are indications that
he studied parts of it carefully.61
Russell’s influence, however, is minor compared to Hilbert’s, as, indeed, Herbrand
was most interested in proving consistency, decidability, and completeness. Jean van
Heijenoort (1912–1986) notes on Herbrand:
“The difficulties provoked by the Russell Paradox, stratification, ramification,
the problems connected with the axiom of infinity or the axiom of reducibility,
nothing of that seems to retain his attention.
The reason for this attitude is that Herbrand does not share Russell’s con-
ception concerning the relation between logic and mathematics, but had adopted
Hilbert’s. In 1930 Herbrand indicates quite well where he sees the limits of
Russell’s accomplishment: ‘So far we have only replaced ordinary language
with another more convenient one, but this does not help us at all with re-
spect to the problems regarding the principles of mathematics.’ [Herbrand,
1930a, p. 248; 1971, p. 208]. And the sentence that follows indicates the way to
be followed: ‘Hilbert sought to resolve the questions which can be raised by
applying himself to the study of collections of signs which are translations of
propositions true in a determinate theory.’ ” [Heijenoort, 1986c, p.105].
As Herbrand’s major orientation was toward the Hilbert school, it is not surprising
that the majority of his citations62 refer to mathematicians related either to the Hilbert
school or to Göttingen, which was the Mecca of mathematicians until its intellectual and
organizational destruction by the Nazis in 1933.
By the title of his thesis Recherches sur la théorie de la démonstration, Herbrand
clearly commits himself to King Hilbert’s following, and being the first contributor to
Hilbert’s finitistic program in France, he was given the opportunity to write on Hilbert’s
logic in a French review journal, and this paper [Herbrand, 1930a] is historically inter-
esting because it captures Herbrand’s personal view of Hilbert’s finitistic program.
61Herbrand seems to have studied ∗9 and ∗10 of [Whitehead & Russell, 1910–1913, Vol. I] carefully,
leaving traces in Herbrand’s PropertyA and in Chapter 2 of Herbrand’s PhD thesis, cf. [Heijenoort,
1986c, pp. 102–106].
62In his thesis [Herbrand, 1930], Herbrand cites [Ackermann, 1925], [Artin & Schreier, 1927],
[Behmann, 1922], [Bernays, 1928], [Bernays & Schönfinkel, 1928], [Hilbert, 1922b; 1926; 1928],
[Hilbert & Ackermann, 1928], and [Neumann, 1925; 1927; 1928]. Furthermore, Herbrand cites
[Nicod, 1917] in [Herbrand, 1930], [Ackermann, 1928] in [Herbrand, 1931], and [Hilbert, 1931]
and [Gödel, 1931] in [Herbrand, 1932a].
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6 A Genius with some Flaws
On the one hand, Herbrand was a creative mathematician whose ideas were truly out-
standing, not only for his time.
Besides logic, he also contributed to class-field theory and to the theory of algebraic num-
ber fields. Although this is not our subject here, we should keep in mind that Herbrand’s
contributions to algebra are as important from a mathematical point of view and as nu-
merous as his contributions to logic.63
Among the many statements about Herbrand’s abilities as a mathematician isWeil’s
letter to Hasse in August 1931 where he writes that he would not need to tell him what
a loss Herbrand’s death means especially for number theory.64 As Peter B. Andrews
put it:
“Herbrand was by all accounts a brilliant mathematician.”
[Andrews, 2003, p.171].
On the other hand, Herbrand neither had the education nor the supervision to present
his results in proof theory with the technical rigor and standard, say, of the Hilbert
school in the 1920s, let alone today’s emphasis on formal precision.65
Finitistic proof theory sometimes strictly demands the disambiguation of form and con-
tent and a higher degree of precision than most other mathematical fields. Moreover, the
field was novel at Herbrand’s time and probably hardly anybody in France was able to
advise Herbrand competently.
Therefore, Herbrand, a génie créateur, as Heijenoort called him,66 was apt to
make undetected errors. Well known today is a serious flaw in his thesis which stayed
unnoticed by its reviewers at the time. Moreover, several theorems are in fact conceptually
correct, but incorrectly formulated.
63Cf. [Herbrand, 1929c; 1930b; 1930c; 1931e; 1931f; 1931g; 1932b; 1932c; 1932d; 1932e; 1932f; 1933;
1936], [Chevalley & Herbrand, 1931] and [Herbrand & Chevalley, 1931], as well as [Dieudonné,
1982].
64Cf. [Lemmermeyer & Roquette, 2006, p.119, Note 6].
65Heijenoort writes in his well-known “source book”:
“Herbrand’s thesis bears the marks of hasty writing; this is especially true of Chapter 5.
Some sentences are poorly constructed, and the punctuation is haphazard. Herbrand’s
thoughts are not nebulous, but they are so hurriedly expressed that many a passage is am-
biguous or obscure. To bring out the proper meaning of the text the translators had to depart
from a literal rendering, and more rewriting has been allowed in this translation than in any
other translation included in the present volume.” [Heijenoort, 1971a, p. 525]
Similarly, Warren Goldfarb, the translator and editor of Herbrand’s logical writings, writes:
“Herbrand also tended to express himself rather hastily, resulting in many obscurities; in
these translations an attempt has been made to balance the demands of literalness and clarity.”
[Herbrand, 1971, p.V]
66Cf. [Herbrand, 1968, p.1].
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Let us have a look at three flaws in § 3.3 of the Chapters 2, 3 and 5, respectively:
Chapter 2, § 3.3: A typical instance for an incorrectly formulated theorem which is con-
ceptually correct can be found in Chapter 2, § 3.3, on deep inference:
From ⊢ B ⇒ C we can conclude ⊢ A[B] ⇒ A[C], provided that [· · ·] denotes
only positive positions67 in A.
Herbrand, however, states
⊢ (B ⇒ C) ⇒ (A[B] ⇒ A[C])
which is not valid; to wit68 apply the substitution
{ A[. . .] 7→ ∀x. [. . .], B 7→ true, C 7→ P(x) }.
Chapter 3, § 3.3: Incorrectly formulated is also Herbrand’s theorem on the relativiza-
tion of quantifiers.69 This error was recognized later by Herbrand himself.70
Moreover, note that in this context, Herbrand discusses the many-sorted first-order
logic related to the restriction to the language where all quantifiers are relativized,
extending a similar discussion found already in [Peirce, 1885].
All of this is not terribly interesting, except that it gives us some clues on how Herbrand
developed his theorems: It seems that he started, like any mathematician, with a strong
intuition of the semantics and used it to formulate the theorem. Then he had a careful look
at those parts of the proof that might violate the finitistic standpoint. The final critical
check of minor details of the formalism in the actual proof,71 however, hardly played a rôle
in this work.
Chapter 5, § 3.3: The drawback of his intuitive style of work manifests itself in a serious
mistake, which concerns a lemma that has crucial applications in the proof of the
Fundamental Theorem, namely the “lemma” of Chapter 5, § 3.3, which we will call
Herbrand’s “False Lemma”. Before we discuss this in § 11, however, we have to
define some notions.
67Note that a position in a formula (seen as a tree built-up from logical operators ‘∧’, ‘∨’, ‘¬’, ‘∀’, and ‘∃’)
is positive if the number of ¬-operators preceding it on the path from the root position is even, and negative
if it is uneven.
68Cf. also [Herbrand, 1971, Goldfarb’s Notes 6 (p.78) and A (p. 98)].
69Relativization of quantifiers was first discussed in the elaboration of first-order logic in [Peirce,
1885]. Roughly speaking, it means to restrict quantifiers to a predicate P by replacing any ∀x. A
with ∀x. (P(x) ⇒ A), and, dually, ∃x. A with ∃x. (P(x) ∧ A).
70In Note 1 of [Herbrand, 1932a].
71Cf. [Hadamard, 1949, ChapterV] for a nice account of this mode of mathematical creativity.
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7 Herbrand Universe, Champs Finis, and
Herbrand Expansion
Most students of logic or computer science knowHerbrand’s name in the form ofHerbrand
universe or Herbrand expansion.
Today, the Herbrand universe is usually defined as the set of all terms over a given
signature, and the Herbrand expansion of a set of formulas results from a systematic re-
placement of all variables in that set of formulas with terms from the Herbrand universe.
Historically, however, this is not quite correct. First of all, Herbrand does not use
term structures for two reasons:
1. Herbrand typically equates terms with objects of the universe, and thereby avoids
working explicitly with term structures.72
2. As a finitist more royal than King Hilbert, Herbrand does not accept structures
with infinite universes.
7.1 Champs Finis
As a finite substitute for a typically infinite full term universe, Herbrand uses what he
calls a champ fini of order n, which we will denote with Tn. Such a champ fini differs from
a full term universe in containing only the terms t with |t| < n . We use |t| to denote
the height of the term t, which is given by
|f(t1, . . . , tm)| = 1 +max{0, |t1| , . . . , |tm| }.
The terms of Tn are constructed from the function symbols and constant symbols (which
we will tacitly subsume under the function symbols in the following) of a finite signature
and from a finite set of variables. We will assume that an additional variable l, the lexicon,
is included in this construction, if necessary to have Tn 6= ∅.
72As this equating of terms has no essential function in Herbrand’s works, but only adds extra compli-
cation to Herbrand’s subjects, we will completely ignore it here and exclusively use free term structures
in what follows.
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7.2 Herbrand Expansion
The first elaborate description of first-order logic — under the name “first-intentional logic
of relatives” — was published by Peirce [1885] shortly after the invention of quantifiers by
Frege [1879]. What today we call an Herbrand expansion was implicitly given already
in that publication [Peirce, 1885]. Herbrand spoke of “reduction” (réduite) instead.
Herbrand prefers to treat all logical symbols besides ‘¬’, ‘∨’, and ‘∃’ as defined. Only in
prenex forms, the universal quantifier ‘∀’ is also treated as a primitive symbol.
Definition 7.1 (Herbrand Expansion, AT )
For a finite set of terms T , the expansion AT of a formula A is defined as follows:
AT = A if A does not have a quantifier, (¬A)T = ¬AT , (A ∨ B)T = AT ∨ BT ,
(∃x.A)T =
∨
t∈T A
T{x7→t}, and (∀x.A)T =
∧
t∈T A
T{x7→t}, where AT{x7→t} denotes
the result of applying the substitution {x7→t} to AT . 
Example 7.2 (Herbrand Expansion, AT )
For example, for T := { 3, z+ 2 }, and for A being the arithmetic formula
∀x. (x= 0 ∨ ∃y. x= y+ 1),
the expansion AT is
 3= 0∨ 3= 3+ 1
∨ 3=(z+ 2) + 1

 ∧

 z+ 2= 0∨ z+ 2= 3+ 1
∨ z+ 2= (z+ 2) + 1

.

The Herbrand expansion reduces a first-order formula to sentential logic in such a way
that a sentential formula is reduced to itself, and that the semantics is invariant if the terms
in T range over the whole universe. If, however, this is not the case — such as in our above
example and for all infinite universes —, then Herbrand expansion changes the semantics
by relativization of the quantifiers69 to range only over those elements of the universe to
which the elements of T evaluate.
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8 Skolemization, Smullyan’s Uniform Notation,
and γ- and δ-quantification
A first-order formula may contain existential as well as universal quantifiers. Can we make
it more uniform by replacing either of them?
Consider the formula ∀x. ∃y.Q(x, y). These two quantifiers express a functional depen-
dence between the values for x and y, which could also be expressed by a (new) function,
say g, such that ∀x.Q(x, g(x)), i.e. this function g chooses for each x the correct value
for y, provided that it exists. In other words, we can replace any existentially quantified
variable x which occurs in the scope of universal quantifiers for y1, . . . , yn with the new
Skolem term g(y1, . . . , yn).
This replacement, carried out for all existential quantifiers, results in a formula hav-
ing only universal quantifiers. Using the convention that all free variables are universally
quantified, we may then just drop these quantifiers as well. Roughly speaking, this transfor-
mation, Skolemization as we call it today, leaves satisfiability invariant. It occurs for the
first time explicitly in [Skolem, 1928], but was already used in an awkward formulation
in [Schröder, 1895] and [Löwenheim, 1915].
For reasons that will become apparent later, Herbrand employs a form of Skolem-
ization that is dual to the one above. Now the universal variables are removed first, so
that all remaining variables are existentially quantified. How can this be done? Well, if the
universally quantified variable x occurs in the scope of the existentially quantified variables
y1, . . . , ym, we can replace x with the Skolem term xδ(y1, . . . , ym). The second-order
variable or first-order function symbol xδ in this Skolem term stands for any function with
arguments y1, . . . , ym. Roughly speaking, this dual form of Skolemization leaves validity
invariant.
For example, let us consider the formula ∃y. ∀x.Q(x, y). Assuming the Axiom of
Choice and the standard interpretation of (higher-order) quantification, all of the following
statements are logically equivalent:
• ∃y. ∀x.Q(x, y) holds.
• There is an object y such that Q(x, y) holds for every object x.
• ∃y.Q(xδ(y), y) holds for every function xδ.
• ∀f. ∃y.Q(f(y), y) holds.
Now ∃y.Q(xδ(y), y) is called the Skolemized form of ∃y. ∀x.Q(x, y). The variable or
function symbols xδ of increased logical order are called Skolem functions.73 The Skolem-
ized form is also called functional form (with several addenda specifying the dualities),
because Skolemization turns the object variable x into a function variable or function
symbol xδ(· · ·).
73Herbrand calls Skolem functions index functions, translated according to [Herbrand, 1971]. More-
over, in [Dreben & Denton, 1970], [Scanlon, 1973], and [Goldfarb & Scanlon, 1974], we find the
term indicial functions instead of “index functions”. The name “Skolem function” was used in [Gödel,
1939], probably for the first time, cf. [Anellis, 2006].
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Note that A⇒B and ¬A ∨ B and ¬(A ∧ ¬B) are equivalent in two-valued logic.
So are ¬∀x.A and ∃x.¬A, as well as ¬∃x.A and ∀x.¬A.
Accordingly, the uniform notation (as introduced in [Smullyan, 1968]) is a modern
classification of formulas into only four categories: α, β, γ, and δ.
More important than the classification of formulas is the associated classification of the
reductive inference rules applicable to them as principal formulas.
According to [Gentzen, 1935], but viewed under the aspect of reduction (i.e. the
converse of deduction), the principal formula of an inference rule is the one which is
(partly) replaced by its immediate “sub”-formulas, depending on its topmost operator.
• An α-formula is one whose validity reduces to the validity of a single operand of its
topmost operator.
For example, A ∨ B may be reduced either to A or to B, and A ⇒ B may be
reduced either to ¬A or to B.
• A β-formula is one whose validity reduces to the validity of both operands of its
topmost binary operator, introducing two cases of proof (β = branching).
For example, A ∧ B reduces to both A and B, and ¬(A ⇒ B) reduces to both
A and ¬B.
• A γ-formula is one whose validity reduces to the validity of alternative instances of
its topmost quantifier.
For example, ∃y. A reduces to A{y 7→yγ} in addition to ∃y. A, for a fresh free
γ-variable yγ. Similarly, ¬∀y. A reduces to ¬A{y 7→yγ} in addition to ¬∀y. A.
Free γ-variables may be globally instantiated at any time in a reduction proof.
• A δ-formula is one whose validity reduces to the validity of the instance of its topmost
quantifier with its Skolem term.
For example, ∀x.A reduces to A{x7→xδ(yγ1, . . . , y
γ
m)}, where y
γ
1, . . . , y
γ
m are the free
γ-variables already in use.74
For a more elaborate introduction into free γ- and δ-variables see [Wirth, 2008].
74In the game-theoretic semantics of first-order logic, the δ-variables (such as xδ in the above example)
stand for the unknown choices by our opponent in the game, whereas, for showing validity, we have to
specify a winning strategy by describing a finite number of first-order terms as alternative solutions for the
γ-variables (such as yγ
i
above), cf. e.g. [Hintikka, 1996].
27
Herbrand considers validity and Skolemized form as above in his thesis. In a similar
context, which we will have to discuss below, Skolem considers unsatisfiability, a dual of
validity, and Skolem normal form in addition to Skolemized form. As it was standard
at his time, Herbrand called the two kinds of quantifiers — i.e. for γ- and δ-formulas75 —
restricted and general quantifiers, respectively. To avoid the problem of getting lost in
several dualities in what follows, we prefer to speak of γ-quantifiers and δ-quantifiers in-
stead. The variables bound by δ-quantifiers will be called bound δ-variables. The variables
bound by γ-quantifiers will be called bound γ-variables.
For a first-order formula A in which any bound variable is bound exactly once and does
not occur again free, we define:
The outer 76 Skolemized form of A results from A by removing any δ-quantifier and
replacing its bound variable x with xδ(y1, . . . , ym), where xδ is a new symbol
and y1, . . . , ym, in this order,77 are the variables of the γ-quantifiers in whose scope
the δ-quantifier occurs.
75Note that it is obvious how to generalize the definition of α-, β-, γ- and δ-formulas from top positions to
inner occurrences according to the category into which they would fall in a stepwise reduction. Therefore,
we can speak of α-, β-, γ- and δ-formulas also for the case of subformulas and classify their quantifiers
accordingly.
76Herbrand has no name for the outer Skolemized form and he does not use the inner Skolemized
form, which is the current standard in two-valued first-order logic and which is required for our discussion
in Note 92.
The inner Skolemized form of A results from A by repeating the following until all δ-quantifiers have
been removed: Remove an outermost δ-quantifier and replace its bound variable x with xδ(y1, . . . , ym),
where xδ is a new symbol and y1, . . . , ym, in this order, are the variables of the γ-quantifiers in whose
scope the δ-quantifier occurs and which actually occur in the scope of the δ-quantifier.
The inner Skolemized form is closely related to the liberalized δ-rule (also called δ+-rule) in reductive
calculi, such as sequent, tableau, or matrix calculi; cf. e.g. [Baaz & Fermüller, 1995], [Nonnengart,
1996], [Wirth, 2004, §§ 1.2.3 and 2.1.5], [Wirth, 2006], [Wirth, 2008, § 4].
77Contrary to our fixation of the order of the variables as arguments to the Skolem functions (to achieve
uniqueness of the notion), Herbrand does not care for the order in his definition of the outer Skolemized
form. Whenever he takes the order into account, however, he orders by occurrence from left to right or
else by the height of the terms w.r.t. a substitution, but never by the names of the variables.
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9 Axioms and Rules of Inference
In the following we will present the calculi of Herbrand’s thesis (i.e. the axioms and rules
of inference) as required for our presentation of the Fundamental Theorem.
When we speak of a term, a formula, or a structure, we refer to first-order terminology
without mentioning this explicitly. When we explicitly speak of “first order”, however,
this is to emphasize the contrast to sentential logic.
Sentential Tautology: Let B be a first-order formula. B is a sentential tautology if
it is quantifier-free and truth-functionally valid, provided its atomic subformulas are
read as atomic sentential variables.78
Modus Ponens: A A ⇒ BB .
Generalized Rule of γ-Quantification:
A[B{x 7→ t}]
A[γx.B]
, where the free variables of the
term t must not be bound by quantifiers in B, and γ stands for ∃ if [. . .] denotes a
positive position67 in A[. . .], and γ stands for ∀ if this position is negative. Moreover,
we require that [. . .] does not occur in the scope of any quantifier in A[. . .]. This
requirement is not necessary for soundness, but for the constructions in the proof of
Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem.
For example, we get
(t≺ t) ∨ ¬(t≺ t)
(t≺ t) ∨ ∃x. ¬(x≺ t)
and
(t≺ t) ∨ ¬(t≺ t)
(t≺ t) ∨ ¬∀x. (x≺ t)
via the meta-level substitutions
{ A[. . .] 7→ (t≺ t) ∨ [. . .], B 7→ ¬(x≺ t) }
and
{ A[. . .] 7→ (t≺ t) ∨ ¬[. . .], B 7→ (x≺ t) },
respectively.
Note that Herbrand considers equality of formulas only up to renaming of bound
variables and often implicitly assumes that a bound variable is bound only once and
does not occur free. Thus, if a free variable y of the term t is bound by quantifiers
in B, an implicit renaming of the bound occurrences of y in B is admitted to enable
backward application of the inference rule.
78Note that this notion is more restrictive than the following, which is used by Herbrand in his thesis
only initially, but which is standard for the predicate calculi of the Hilbert school and the Principia
Mathematica; cf. [Hilbert & Bernays, 2013b, Editors’ Preface to PartB of Volume I, p. lxiii f.] (or
[Hilbert & Bernays, 1934, §§ 3–5], [Hilbert & Bernays, 1939, Supplement ID]), [Whitehead &
Russell, 1910–1913, *10]. B is a substitutional sentential tautology if there is a truth-functionally valid
sentential formula A and a substitution σ mapping any sentential variable in A to a first-order formula
such that B is Aσ. For example, both P(x) ∨ ¬P(x) and ∃x. P(x) ∨ ¬∃x. P(x) are substitutional
sentential tautologies, related to the truth-functionally valid sentential formula p ∨ ¬p, but only the first
one is a sentential tautology.
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Generalized Rule of δ-Quantification:
A[B]
A[δx. B]
, where the variable x must not
occur in the context A[. . .], and δ stands for ∀ if [. . .] denotes a positive position
in A[. . .], and δ stands for ∃ if this position is negative. Moreover, both for sound-
ness and for the reason mentioned above, we require that [. . .] does not occur in the
scope of any quantifier in A[. . .].
Again, if x occurs in the context A[. . .], an implicit renaming of the bound occurrences
of x in δx. B is admitted to enable backward application.
Generalized Rule of Simplification:
A[B ◦B]
A[B]
, where ◦ stands for ∨ if [. . .] denotes
a positive position in A[. . .], and ◦ stands for ∧ if this position is negative.
To enable a forward application of the inference rule, the bound variables may be
renamed such that the two occurrences of B become equal.
Moreover, the Generalized Rule of γ-Simplification is the sub-rule for the case that
B is of the form ∃y.C if [. . .] denotes a positive position in A[. . .], and of the form ∀y.C
if this position is negative.
To avoid the complication of quantifiers within a formula, where it is hard to keep track
of the scope of each individual quantification, all quantifiers can be moved to the front,
provided some caution is taken with the renaming of quantified variables. This is called the
prenex form of a formula. The anti-prenex form results from the opposite transformation,
i.e. from moving the quantifiers inward as much as possible. Herbrand achieves these
transformations with his Rules of Passage.
Rules of Passage: The following six logical equivalences may be used for rewriting from
left to right (prenex direction) and from right to left (anti-prenex direction), resulting
in twelve deep inference rules:
(1) ¬∀x.A ⇔ ∃x.¬A
(2) ¬∃x.A ⇔ ∀x.¬A
(3) (∀x.A) ∨ B ⇔ ∀x. (A∨B)
(4) B ∨ ∀x.A ⇔ ∀x. (B ∨A)
(5) (∃x.A) ∨ B ⇔ ∃x. (A∨B)
(6) B ∨ ∃x.A ⇔ ∃x. (B ∨A)
Here, B is a formula in which the variable x does not occur. As explained above,
if x occurs free in B, an implicit renaming of the bound occurrences of x in A is
admitted to enable rewriting in prenex direction.
If we restrict the “Generalized” rules to outermost applications only (i.e., if we restrict A
to be the empty context), we obtain the rules without the attribute “Generalized”, i.e. the
Rules of γ- and δ-Quantification and the Rule of Simplification.79
79The Generalized Rules of Quantification are introduced (under varying names) in [Heijenoort, 1968;
1975; 1982; 1986c] and under the names (µ∗) and (ν∗) in [Hilbert & Bernays, 1970, p.166], but not in
the first edition [Hilbert & Bernays, 1939]. Herbrand had only the non-generalized versions of the
Rules of Quantification and named them “First and Second Rule of Generalization”, translated according
to [Herbrand, 1971]. Note that the restrictions of the Generalized Rules of Quantification guarantee the
equivalence of the generalized and the non-generalized versions by the Rules of Passage; cf. [Heijenoort,
1968, p. 6]. Herbrand’s name for modus ponens is “Rule of Implication”. Moreover, “(Generalized) Rule
of Simplification” and “Rules of Passage” are Herbrand’s names. All other names introduced in § 9 are
our own invention to simplify our following presentation.
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10 Normal Identities, Properties A, B, and C, and
Herbrand Disjunction and Complexity
Key notions of Herbrand’s thesis are normal identity, PropertyA, PropertyB, and Prop-
erty C. Property C is the most important and the only one we need in this account.80
Herbrand’s Property C was implicitly used already in [Löwenheim, 1915] and
[Skolem, 1928], but as an explicit notion, it was first formulated in Herbrand’s thesis.
It is the main property of Herbrand’s work and may well be called the central property
of first-order logic, for reasons to be explained in the following.
In essence, Property C captures the following intuition taken from [Löwenheim, 1915]:
Assuming the Axiom of Choice, the validity of a formula A is equivalent to the validity of
its Skolemized form F . Moreover, the validity of F would be equivalent to the validity
of the Herbrand expansion F U for a universe U , provided only that this expansion were
a finite formula and did not vary over different universes. To provide this, we replace
the semantical objects of the universe U with syntactical objects, namely the countable set
of all terms, used as “place holders” or names. To get a finite formula, we again replace
this set of terms, which is infinite in general, with the champ fini Tn, as defined in § 7.
If we can show F Tn to be a sentential tautology for some positive natural number n, then
we know that the γ-quantifications in F have solutions in any structure, and so we know
that F and A are valid.81 Otherwise, the Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem says that A is
invalid.
Definition 10.1 (Property C, Herbrand Disjunction, Herbrand Complexity)
Let A be a first-order formula, in which, without loss of generality, any bound variable is
bound exactly once and does not occur again free, neither as a variable nor as a function
symbol. Let F be the outer Skolemized form of A. Let n be a positive natural number.
Let the champ fini Tn be formed over the function and free variable symbols occurring in F .
A has Property C of order n if the Herbrand expansion F Tn is a sentential tautology.
The Herbrand expansion F Tn is sententially equivalent to the so-called Herbrand
disjunction of A of order n, which is the finite disjunction
∨
σ: Y→Tn
Eσ, where Y is the
set of bound (γ-) variables of F , and E results from F by removing all (γ-) quantifiers.
This form of representation can be used to define the Herbrand complexity of A, which
is the minimal number of instances of E whose disjunction is a sentential tautology.82 
80Here are the definitions for the omitted notions normal identity, PropertyA, and Property B for a
formula D. D is a normal identity if D has a linear proof starting with a sentential tautology, possibly
followed by applications of the Rules of Quantification, and finally possibly followed by applications of the
Rules of Passage. D has PropertyA if D has a linear proof starting with a sentential tautology, possibly
followed by applications of the Rules of Quantification, and finally possibly followed by applications of the
Rules of Passage and the Generalized Rule of Simplification. Herbrand’s original definition of PropertyA
is technically more complicated, but extensionally defines the same property and is also intensionally very
similar. Finally, D has Property B of order n if D′ has Property C of order n, where D′ results from
possibly repeated application of the Rules of Passage to D, in anti-prenex direction as long as possible.
81Indeed, we have F Tn ⊢ A, cf. Theorem4 in [Heijenoort, 1975], which roughly is our Lemma 13.1.
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Example 10.2 (Property C, Herbrand Disjunction, Herbrand Complexity)
Let A be the following formula, which says that if we have transitivity and an upper bound
of two elements, then we also have an upper bound of three elements:
∀a, b, c. (a≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a≺ c)
∧ ∀x, y. ∃m. (x≺m ∧ y≺m)
⇒ ∀u, v, w. ∃n. (u≺ n ∧ v≺n ∧ w≺n)
(A)
The outer Skolemized form F of A is
∀a, b, c. (a≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a≺ c)
∧ ∀x, y. (x≺mδ(x, y) ∧ y≺mδ(x, y))
⇒ ∃n. (uδ≺n ∧ vδ≺n ∧ wδ≺n)
(F )
The result of removing the quantifiers from F is the formula E:
(a≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a≺ c)
∧ x≺mδ(x, y) ∧ y≺mδ(x, y)
⇒ uδ≺n ∧ vδ≺n ∧ wδ≺n
(E)
By semantical considerations it is obvious that a solution for n is mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)). This is
a term of height 3, which suggests that A has Property C of order 4. Let us show that this
is indeed the case and that the Herbrand complexity of A is 2. Consider the following 2
substitutions: { a 7→vδ, b 7→mδ(vδ, wδ), c 7→mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)),
x 7→vδ, y 7→wδ, n 7→mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)) };
{ a 7→wδ, b 7→mδ(vδ, wδ), c 7→mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)),
x 7→uδ, y 7→mδ(vδ, wδ), n 7→mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)) }.
Indeed, if we normalize the Herbrand disjunction generated by these two substitutions
to a disjunctive normal form (i.e. a disjunctive set of conjunctions) we get the following
sentential tautology.
{ vδ≺mδ(vδ, wδ) ∧ mδ(vδ, wδ)≺mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)) ∧ vδ⊀mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)),
wδ≺mδ(vδ, wδ) ∧ mδ(vδ, wδ)≺mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)) ∧ wδ⊀mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)),
vδ⊀mδ(vδ, wδ), wδ⊀mδ(vδ, wδ),
uδ⊀mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)), mδ(vδ, wδ)⊀mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)),
uδ≺mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)) ∧ vδ≺mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)) ∧ wδ≺mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)) }
(C)

The different treatment of δ-quantifiers and γ-quantifiers in Property C, namely by
Skolemization and Herbrand expansion, respectively, as found in [Skolem, 1928] and
[Herbrand, 1930], rendered the reduction to sentential logic by hand (or actually today,
with a computer) practically executable for the first time.83 This different treatment of
the two kinds of quantification is inherited from the Peirce–Schröder tradition59 which
came on Herbrand via Löwenheim and Skolem. Russell and Hilbert had already
merged that tradition with the one of Frege, sometimes emphasizing their Frege her-
itage over one of Peirce and Schröder.84 It was Herbrand who completed the bridge
between these two traditions with his Fundamental Theorem, as depicted in § 12 below.
82Herbrand has no name for Herbrand disjunction and does not use the notion of Herbrand com-
plexity, which, however, is closely related to Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem, which says that the
Herbrand complexity of A is always defined as a positive natural number, provided that ⊢A holds.
More formally, the Herbrand complexity of A is defined as the minimal cardinality |S| such that, for
some positive natural number m and some S ⊆ Y → Tm, the finite disjunction
∨
σ∈S Eσ is a
sentential tautology. It is useful in the comparison of logical calculi w.r.t. their smallest proofs for certain
generic sets of formulas, cf. e.g. [Baaz & Fermüller, 1995].
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11 Herbrand’s “False Lemma”
For a given positive natural number n, Herbrand’s “False Lemma” says that Property C
of order n is invariant under the application of the Rules of Passage.
The basic function of Herbrand’s “False Lemma” in the proof of Herbrand’s Funda-
mental Theorem is to establish the logical equivalence of Property C of a formula A with
Property C of the prenex and anti-prenex forms of A, cf. § 9.
Herbrand’s Lemma is wrong because the Rules of Passage may change the outer
Skolemized form. This happens whenever a γ-quantifier binding x is moved over a binary
operator whose unchanged operand B contains a δ-quantifier.85
To find a counterexample for Herbrand’s Lemma for the case of Property C of order 2,
let us consider moving out the γ-quantifier “∃x.” in the valid formula
(∃x.P(x)) ∨ ¬∃y.P(y).
The (outer) Skolemized form of this formula is
(∃x.P(x)) ∨ ¬P(yδ).
The Herbrand disjunction over the single substitution {x 7→yδ} is a sentential tautology.
The outer Skolemized form after moving out the “∃x.” is
∃x.
(
P(x) ∨ ¬P(yδ(x))
)
.
To get a sentential tautology again, we now have to take the Herbrand disjunction over
both {x 7→yδ(l)} and {x 7→l} (instead of the single {x 7→yδ}), for the lexicon l.
This, however, is not really a counterexample for Herbrand’s Lemma because
Herbrand treated the lexicon l as a variable and defined the height of a Skolem con-
stant to be 1, and the height of a variable to be 0, so that |yδ| = 1 = |yδ(l)| . As free
variables and Skolem constants play exactly the same rôle, this definition of height is a
bit unintuitive and was possibly introduced to avoid this counterexample.
However, for the similar formula(
(∃x.P(x)) ∧ ∀y.Q(y)
)
∨ ¬(∃x.P(x)) ∨ ¬∀y.Q(y)
after moving the first γ-quantifier “∃x.” out over the “∧”, we have to apply
instead of
{ x 7→ xδ, y 7→ yδ(xδ) }
{ x 7→ xδ, y 7→ yδ }
to get a sentential tautology, and we have |yδ| = 1 and |yδ(xδ)| = 2, and thus yδ ∈ T2,
but yδ(xδ) /∈ T2.
This means: Property C of order 2 varies under a single application of a Rule of Passage,
and thus we have a proper counterexample for Herbrand’s “False Lemma” here.
83For instance, the elimination of both γ- and δ-quantifiers with the help of Hilbert’s ε-operator suffers
from an exponential complexity in formula size. As a result, already small formulas grow so large that
the mere size makes them inaccessible to human inspection; and this is still the case for the term-sharing
representation of ε-terms of [Wirth, 2008].
84While this emphasis on Frege will be understood by everybody who ever had the fascinating experience
of reading Frege, it put some unjustified bias to the historiography of modern logic, still present in the
selection of the famous source book [Heijenoort, 1971a]; cf. e.g. [Anellis, 1992, Chapter 3].
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11.1 Bernays’ Correction
In 1939, Bernays remarked that Herbrand’s proof is hard to follow86 and — for the
first time — published a sound proof of a version of Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem
which is restricted to prenex form, but more efficient in the number of terms that have to
be considered in a Herbrand disjunction than Herbrand’s quite global limitation to all
terms t with |t| < n, related to Property C of order n.87
11.2 Gödel’s and Dreben’s Correction
According to a conversation withHeijenoort in autumn1963,88 Gödel noticed the lacuna
in the proof of Herbrand’s “False Lemma” in 1943 and wrote a private note, but did
not publish it. While Gödel’s documented attempts to construct a counterexample to
Herbrand’s “False Lemma” failed, he had actually worked out a correction ofHerbrand’s
“False Lemma”, which is sufficient for the proof of Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem.89
In 1962, when Gödel’s correction was still unknown, a young student, Peter B.
Andrews, had the audacity to tell his advisor Alonzo Church (1903–1995) that there
seemed to be a gap in the proof of Herbrand’s (False) Lemma. Church sent Andrews
to Burton Dreben (1927–1999), who finally came up with a counterexample. And then
Andrews constructed a simpler counterexample (essentially the one we presented above)
and joint work found a correction similar to Gödel’s,90 which we will call Gödel’s and
Dreben’s correction in § 13.
Roughly speaking, the corrected lemma says that — to keep Property C of A invariant
under (a single application of) a Rule of Passage — we may have to step from order n to
order
n · (N r + 1)n.
Here r is the number of γ-quantifiers in whose scope the Rule of Passage is applied and N
is the cardinality of Tn for the function symbols in the outer Skolemized form of A.91
This correction is not particularly elegant because — iterated several times until a
prenex form is reached — it can lead to pretty high orders. Thus, although this correction
serves well for soundness and finitism, it results in a complexity that is unacceptable in
practice (e.g. in automated reasoning) already for small non-prenex formulas.
85Here we use the same meta variables as in our description of the Rules of Passage in § 9 and assume
that x does not occur free in B.
86In Note 1 of [Hilbert & Bernays, 1939, p.158] ([Hilbert & Bernays, 1970, p.161]), we read: “Die
Herbrandsche Beweisführung ist schwer zu verfolgen”
87Cf. § 3.3 of [Hilbert & Bernays, 1939]. In the second edition [Hilbert & Bernays, 1970], Bernays
also indicates how to remove the restriction to prenex formulas.
88Cf. [Herbrand, 1968, p. 8, Note j].
89Cf. [Goldfarb, 1993].
90Cf. [Andrews, 2003], [Dreben &al., 1963], [Dreben & Denton, 1963].
91Cf. [Dreben & Denton, 1963, p. 393].
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11.3 Heijenoort’s Correction
The problems with Herbrand’s “False Lemma” in the step from Property C to a proof
without modus ponens in his Fundamental Theorem (cf. § 13) result primarily92 from a
detour over prenex form, which was standard at Herbrand’s time. Löwenheim and
Skolem had always reduced their problems to prenex forms of various kinds. The reduction
of a proof task to prenex form has several disadvantages, however, such as serious negative
effects on proof complexity.93 If Jacques Herbrand had known of his flaw, he would
probably have avoided the whole detour over prenex forms, namely in the form of what we
will call Heijenoort’s correction,94 which avoids an intractable and unintuitive95 rise in
complexity, cf. § 13.
92Secondarily, the flaw in Herbrand’s “False Lemma” is a peculiarity of the outer Skolemized form.
For the inner Skolemized form (cf. Note 76), moving γ-quantifiers with the Rules of Passage cannot change
the number of arguments of the Skolem functions. This does not help, however, because, for the inner
Skolemized form, moving a δ-quantifier may change the number of arguments of its Skolem function if
the Rule of Passage is applied within the scope of a γ-quantifier whose bound variable occurs in B but not
in A.85 The inner Skolemized form of
∃y1. ∀z1. Q(y1, z1) ∨ ∃y2. ∀z2. Q(y2, z2)
is
∃y1. Q(y1, zδ1(y1)) ∨ ∃y2. Q(y2, z
δ
2(y2)),
but the inner Skolemized form of any prenex form has a binary Skolem function, unless we use Henkin
quantifiers as found in Hintikka’s first-order logic, cf. [Hintikka, 1996].
93Cf. e.g. [Baaz & Fermüller, 1995]; [Baaz & Leitsch, 1995].
94The first published hints on Heijenoort’s correction are [Heijenoort, 1971a, Note 77, p. 555] and
[Herbrand, 1971, Note 60, p.171]. On page 99 of [Heijenoort, 1986c], without giving a definition,
Heijenoort speaks of generalized versions (which Herbrand did not have) of the rules of “existential-
ization and universalization”, which we have formalized in our Generalized Rules of Quantification in § 9.
Having studied Herbrand’s PhD thesis [Herbrand, 1930] and [Heijenoort, 1968; 1975], what Heijen-
oort’s generalized rules must look like can be inferred from the following two facts: Herbrand has a
generalized version of his Rule of Simplification in addition to a non-generalized one. Rewriting with
the Generalized Rule of γ-Quantification within the scope of quantifiers would not permit Herbrand’s
constructive proof of his Fundamental Theorem.
Note that Heijenoort’s correction avoids the detour over the Extended First ε-Theorem of the proof
of Bernays mentioned above; cf. Note 87. Moreover, Heijenoort gets along without Herbrand’s
complicated prenex forms with raised γ-multiplicity, which are required for Herbrand’s definition of
PropertyA.
Note, however, that Gödel’s and Dreben’s correction is still needed for the step from a proof with
modus ponens to Property C, i.e. from Statement 4 to Statement 1 in Theorem12.1. As the example on
top of page 201 in [Herbrand, 1971] shows, an intractable increase of the order of Property C cannot be
avoided in general for an inference step by modus ponens.
95Unintuitive e.g. in the sense of [Tait, 2006].
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12 The Fundamental Theorem
The Fundamental Theorem of Jacques Herbrand is not easy to comprehend at first,
because of its technical nature, but it rests upon a basic intuitive idea, which turned out
to be one of the most profound insights in the history of logic.
We know — and so did Herbrand — that sentential logic is decidable: for any given
sentential formula, we could, for instance, use truth-tables to decide its validity. But what
about a first-order formula with quantifiers?
There is Löwenheim’s and Skolem’s observation that ∀x. P(x) in the context of
the existentially quantified variables y1, . . . , yn stands for P(xδ(y1, . . . , yn)) for an arbitrary
Skolem function xδ(· · ·), as outlined in § 8. This gives us a formula with existential quan-
tifiers only. Now, taking the Herbrand disjunction, an existentially quantified formula
can be shown to be valid, if we find a finite set of names denoting elements from the domain
to be substituted for the existentially quantified variables, such that the resulting sentential
formula is truth-functionally valid. Thus, we have a model-theoretic argumentation how
to reduce a given first-order formula to a sentential one. The semantical elaboration of
this idea is due to Löwenheim and Skolem, and this was known to Herbrand.
But what about the reducibility of an actual proof of a given formula within a first-order
calculus?
The affirmative answer to this question is the essence of Herbrand’s Fundamental
Theorem and the technical device, by which we can eliminate a switch of quantifiers (such
as ∃y. ∀x.Q(x, y) of § 8) is captured in his Property C.
Thus, if we want to cross the river that divides the land of valid first-order formulas
from the land of provable ones, it is the sentential Property C that stands firm in the middle
of that river and holds the bridge, whose first half was built by Löwenheim and Skolem
and the other by Herbrand:
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Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem shows that if a formula A has Property C of some
order n — i.e., by the Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem, if A is a valid (|= A) — then we
not only know of the existence of a proof in any of the standard proof calculi (⊢A), but
we can actually construct a proof for A in Herbrand’s calculus from a given n. The
proof construction process is guided by the champ fini of order n, whose size determines
the multiplicities of γ-quantifiers and whose elements are the terms substituted as witnesses
in the γ-Quantification steps. That proof begins with a sentential tautology and may use
the Rules of γ- and δ-Quantification, the Generalized Rule of Simplification, and the Rules
of Passage.
Contrary to what Herbrand’s “False Lemma” implies, a detour over a prenex form of A
dramatically increases the order of Property C and thus the length of that proof, cf. § 11.
Heijenoort, however, observed that this rise of proof length can be overcome by avoiding
the problematic Rules of Passage with the help of deep (or Generalized) quantification
rules, which may introduce quantifiers deep within formulas (“Heijenoort’s correction”).
We have included these considerations into our statement of Herbrand’s Fundamental
Theorem.
Theorem 12.1 (Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem)
Let A be a first-order formula in which each bound variable is bound by a single quantifier
and does not occur free. The following five statements are logically equivalent. Moreover,
we can construct a witness for any statement from a witness of any other statement.
1. A has Property C of order n for some positive natural number n.
2. We can derive A from a sentential tautology, starting possibly with applications of
the Generalized Rules of γ- and δ-Quantification, which are then possibly followed by
applications of the Generalized Rule of γ-Simplification.
3. We can derive A from a sentential tautology, starting possibly with applications of the
Rules of γ- and δ-Quantification, which are then possibly followed by applications of
the Generalized Rule of γ-Simplification and the Rules of Passage.
4. We can derive A from a sentential tautology with the Rules of γ- and δ-Quantification,
the Rule of Simplification, the Rules of Passage, and Modus Ponens.
5. We can derive A in one of the standard first-order calculi of Principia Mathematica
or of the Hilbert school.96 
The following deserves emphasis: The derivations in the above Statements 2 to 5 as well
as the number n of Statement 1 can be constructed from each other; and this construction
is finitistic in the spirit of Herbrand’s basic beliefs in the nature of proof theory and
metamathematics. Statement 2 is due to Heijenoort’s correction; cf. §§ 11 and 13.
Statement 3 and Herbrand’s PropertyA are extensionally equal and intensionally very
close to each other.
96Cf. [Whitehead & Russell, 1910–1913, *10], [Hilbert & Bernays, 2013b, Editors’ Preface to
PartB of Volume I, p. lxiii f.] (or [Hilbert & Bernays, 1934, §§ 3–5], [Hilbert & Bernays, 1939, Sup-
plement ID]), respectively.
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13 Modus Ponens Elimination
The following lemma provides the step from Statement 1 to Statement 2 of Theorem12.1
with additional details exhibiting an elimination of modus ponens similar to the Cut elim-
ination in Gentzen’s Hauptsatz.
We present the lemma in parallel both in a version following Heijenoort’s correction97
and in a restricted version that gets along without Herbrand’s “False Lemma”. To melt
these two versions into one, we
• underline the parts that are just part of Heijenoort’s correction and
• overline the restriction that is required to get along without Herbrand’s “False
Lemma”.
Thus, the lemma stays valid if we omit either the underlined or else the overlined part of it,
but not both.
Lemma 13.1 (Modus Ponens Elimination)
Let A be a first-order formula in prenex form in which each bound variable is bound by
a single quantifier and does not occur free. Let F be the outer Skolemized form of A.
Let Y be the set of bound (γ-) variables of F . Let E result from F by removing all
(γ-) quantifiers. Let n be a positive natural number. Let the champ fini Tn be formed over
the function and free variable symbols occurring in F .
If A has Property C of order n, then we can construct a derivation of A of the following
form, in which we read any term starting with a Skolem function as an atomic variable:
Step 1: We start with a sentential tautology whose disjunctive normal form is a
re-ordering of a disjunctive normal form of the sentential tautology
∨
σ: Y→Tn
Eσ.
Step 2: Then we may repeatedly apply the Generalized Rules of γ- and δ-Quantification.
Step 3: Then, (after renaming all bound δ-variables) we may repeatedly apply
the Generalized Rule of γ-Simplification. 
Obviously, there is no use of modus ponens in such a proof, and thus, it is linear, i.e. written
as a tree, it has no branching. Moreover, all function and predicate symbols within this
proof occur already in A, and all formulas in the proof are similar to A in the sense that
they have the so-called “sub”-formula property.
97Cf. § 11. We present Heijenoort’s correction actually in form of Theorem4 in [Heijenoort, 1975]
with a slight change, which becomes necessary for our use of Herbrand disjunction instead of the
Herbrand expansion, namely the addition of the underlined part of Step 1 in Lemma 13.1. A strongly
improved and more elaborate version of this whole section on modus ponens elimination, which uses the
much more efficient Herbrand expansion and is directly mirroring Heijenoort’s correction, is found in
[Wirth, 2012, §§ 5.2 and 5.3].
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Example 13.2 (Modus Ponens Elimination) (continuing Example 10.2)
Let us derive the formula A of Example 10.2 in § 10. As A is not in prenex form we have to
apply the version of Lemma13.1 without the overlined part. As explained in Example 10.2,
A has Property C of order n for n=4, and the result of removing the quantifiers from the
outer Skolemized form of A is the formula E:
(a≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a≺ c)
∧ x≺mδ(x, y) ∧ y≺mδ(x, y)
⇒ uδ≺n ∧ vδ≺n ∧ wδ≺n
(E)
Let N denote the cardinality of Tn. Let Tn = {t1, . . . , tN}.
For the case of n=4, we have N = 3+32+(3 + 32)2 = 156, and, for Y := {a, b, c, n, x, y},
the Herbrand disjunction
∨
σ: Y→T4
Eσ has N |Y | elements, i.e. more than 1013. Thus,
we had better try a reduction proof here,98 applying the inference rules backward, and be
content with arriving at a sentential tautology which is a sub-disjunction of a re-ordering
of a disjunctive normal form of
∨
σ: Y→T4
Eσ.
As the backward application of the Generalized Rule of γ-Quantification admits only a
single (i.e. linear) application of each γ-quantifier (or each “lemma”), and as we will have to
apply both the first and the second line of A twice, we first increase the γ-multiplicity of the
top γ-quantifiers of these two lines to two. This is achieved by applying the Generalized
Rule of γ-Simplification twice backward to A, resulting in:99
∀a, b, c. (a≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a≺ c)
∧ ∀a, b, c. (a≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a≺ c)
∧ ∀x, y. ∃m.
(
x≺m
∧ y≺m
)
∧ ∀x, y. ∃m.
(
x≺m
∧ y≺m
)
⇒ ∀u, v, w. ∃n. (u≺n ∧ v≺n ∧ w≺ n)
98As Herbrand’s proof of his version of Lemma 13.1 [Herbrand, 1971, p.170] proceeds reductively too,
we explain Herbrand’s general proof in parallel to the development of our special example, in Notes 99–
101. Herbrand’s proof is interesting by itself and similar to the later proof of the Second ε-Theorem in
[Hilbert & Bernays, 1939, § 3.1].
99To arrive at the full Herbrand disjunction
∨
σ: Y→Tn
Eσ, Herbrand’s proof requires us to apply the
Rule of Simplification top-down at each occurrence of a γ-quantifier N times, and the idea is to substitute ti
for the ith occurrence of this γ-quantifier on each branch.
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Renaming the bound δ-variables to some terms from Tn, and applying the Generalized Rule
of δ-Quantification three times backward in the last line, we get:
∀a, b, c. (a≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a≺ c)
∧ ∀a, b, c. (a≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a≺ c)
∧ ∀x, y. ∃ mδ(vδ, wδ) .
(
x≺ mδ(vδ, wδ)
∧ y≺ mδ(vδ, wδ)
)
∧ ∀x, y. ∃ mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)) .
(
x≺ mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ))
∧ y≺ mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ))
)
⇒ ∃n. ( uδ ≺n ∧ vδ ≺n ∧ wδ ≺ n)
The boxes indicate that the enclosed term actually denotes an atomic variable whose
structure cannot be changed by a substitution. By this nice trick of taking outermost
Skolem terms as names for variables, Herbrand avoids the hard task of giving semantics
to Skolem functions, cf. § 14.100
We apply the Generalized Rule of γ-Quantification four times backward, resulting in appli-
cation of
{x 7→ vδ , y 7→ wδ }
to the third line and
{x 7→ uδ , y 7→ mδ(vδ, wδ) }
to the fourth line. This yields:101
∀a, b, c. (a≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a≺ c)
∧ ∀a, b, c. (a≺ b ∧ b≺ c ⇒ a≺ c)
∧ ∃ mδ(vδ, wδ) . ( vδ ≺ mδ(vδ, wδ) ∧ wδ ≺ mδ(vδ, wδ) )
∧ ∃ mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ)) .
(
uδ ≺ mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ))
∧ mδ(vδ, wδ) ≺ mδ(uδ, mδ(vδ, wδ))
)
⇒ ∃n. ( uδ ≺n ∧ vδ ≺ n ∧ wδ ≺n)
Applying (always backward) the Generalized Rule of δ-Quantification twice and the Gen-
eralized Rule of γ-Quantification seven times, and then dropping the boxes (as they are
irrelevant for sentential reasoning without substitution) and rewriting it all into a disjunctive
list of conjunctions, we arrive at the disjunctive set C of Example 10.2, which is a sentential
tautology. Moreover, as a list, C is obviously a re-ordered sublist of a disjunctive normal
form of
∨
σ: Y→T4
Eσ. 
100According to Herbrand’s proof we would have to replace any bound δ-variable x with its Skolem
term xδ(ti0 , . . . , tik), provided that i0, . . . , ik denotes the branch on which this δ-quantifier occurs w.r.t. the
previous step of raising each γ-multiplicity to N , described in Note 99.
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In the time before Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem, a calculus was basically a means
to describe a set of theorems in a semi-decidable and theoretical fashion. In Hilbert’s
calculi, for instance, the search for concrete proofs is very hard. Contrary to most other
Hilbert-style calculi, the normal form of proofs given in Statement 2 of Theorem12.1,
however, supports the search for reductive proofs: Methods of human102 and automatic103
proof search may help us to find simple proofs in this normal form.
This means that, for the first time in known history, Herbrand’s version of Lemma13.1
gives us the means to search successfully for simple proofs in a formal calculus by hand
(or actually today, with a computer), just as we have done in Example 13.2.104
The normal form of proofs — as given by Lemma13.1 — eliminates detours via modus
ponens in a similar fashion as Gentzen’s Hauptsatz eliminates the Cut. It is remarkable
not only because it establishes a connection between Skolem terms and free variables
without using any semantics for Skolem functions (and thereby, without using the Axiom
of Choice). It also seems to be the first time that a normal form of proofs is shown to exist
in which different phases are considered. Even with Gentzen’s Verschärfter Hauptsatz
following Herbrand in this aspect some years later, the concrete form of Herbrand’s
normal form of proofs remains important to this day, especially in the form of Heijen-
oort’s correction, cf. § 11. The manner in which modern sequent, tableau, and matrix
calculi organize proof search105 does not follow the Hilbert school and their ε-elimination
theorems, but Gentzen’s and Herbrand’s calculi. Moreover, regarding their Skolem-
ization, their deep inference,106 and their focus on γ-quantifiers and their multiplicity, these
modern proof-search calculi are even more in Herbrand’s tradition than in Gentzen’s.
101Note that the terms to be substituted for a bound γ-variable, say y, in such a reduction step can always
be read out from any bound δ-variable in its scope: If there are j γ-quantifiers between the quantifier for y
inclusively and the quantifier for the δ-variable, the value for y is the j th argument of the bound δ-variable,
counting from the last argument backward.
For instance, in the previous reduction step, the variable y in the third line was replaced with wδ , the last
argument of the bound δ-variable mδ(vδ, wδ) , being first in the scope of y.
This property is obvious from Herbrand’s proof but hard to express as a property of proof normalization.
Moreover, this property is useful in Herbrand’s proof for showing that the side condition of the Rule of
γ-Quantification B{x 7→t}∃x.B is always satisfied, even for a certain prenex form. Indeed, γ-variables never
occur in the replacement t and the height of t is strictly smaller than the height of all bound δ-variables in
the scope B, so that no free variable in t can be bound by quantifiers in B; cf. § 9.
102Roughly speaking, we may do a proof by hand, count the lemma applications and remember their
instantiations, and then try to construct a formal normal form proof accordingly, just as we have done in
Example 13.2. See [Wirth, 2004] for more on this.
103Roughly speaking, we may compute the connections and search for a reductive proof in the style of say
[Wallen, 1990], which we then transform into a proof in the normal form of Statement 2 of Theorem12.1.
104Even without the avoidance of the detour over prenex forms due to Heijenoort’s correction, this
already holds for the normal form given by Statement 3 of Theorem12.1, which is extensionally equal to
Herbrand’s original PropertyA. The next further steps to improve this support for proof search would
be sequents and free γ- and δ-variables; cf. e.g. [Wirth, 2004; 2008].
105Cf. e.g. [Wallen, 1990], [Wirth, 2004], [Autexier, 2005].
106Note that although the deep inference rules of Generalized Quantification are an extension of
Herbrand’s calculi by Heijenoort, the deep inference rules of Passage and of Generalized Simplification
are Herbrand’s original contributions.
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14 The Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem and Herbrand’s
Finitistic Notion of Falsehood in an Infinite Domain
Let A be a first-order formula whose terms have a height not greater than m. Herbrand
defines that A is false in an infinite domain if A does not have Property C of order p for
any positive natural number p.
If, for a given positive natural number p, the formula A does not have Property C of
order p, then we can construct a finite structure over the domain Tp+m which falsifies ATp;
cf. § 7. Thus, instead of requiring a single infinite structure in which ATp is false for any
positive natural number p, Herbrand’s notion of falsehood in an infinite domain only
provides us, for each p, with a finite structure in which ATp is false. Herbrand explicitly
points out that these structures do not have to be extensions of each other. From a
given falsifying structure for some p one can, of course, generate falsifying structures for
each p′< p by restriction to Tp′+m. Herbrand thinks, however, that to require an infinite
sequence of structures to be a sequence of extensions would necessarily include some form
of the Axiom of Choice, which he rejects out of principle. Moreover, he writes that the basic
prerequisites of the Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem are generally misunderstood, but does
not make this point clear.
It seems that Herbrand reads [Löwenheim, 1915] as if it would be a paper on
provability instead of validity, i.e. that Herbrand confuses Löwenheim’s ‘|=’ with
Herbrand’s ‘⊢’.
All in all, this is, on the one hand, so peculiar and, on the other hand, so relevant for
Herbrand’s finitistic views of logic and proof theory that some quotations may illuminate
the controversy.
“(On remarquera que cette définition diffère de la définition qu’on pourrait croire
la plus naturelle seulement par le fait que, quand le nombre p augmente, le nou-
veau champ C ′ et les nouvelles valeurs ne peuvent pas forcément être considérés
comme un ‘prolongement’ des anciens; mais cependant, la connaissance de C ′ et
des valeurs pour un nombre p déterminé, entraîne celle d’un champ et de valeurs
convenant pour tout nombre inférieur; seul donc un ‘principe de choix’ pourrait
conduire à prendre un système de valeurs fixe dans un champ infini).”107
107Cf. [Herbrand, 1930, p.109]. Without the comma after “déterminé” also in: [Herbrand, 1968,
p.135f.]
“We observe that this definition differs from the definition that would seem the most natural
only in that, as the number p increases, the new domain C′ and the new values need not be
regarded as forming an ‘extension’ of the previous ones. Clearly, if we know C′ and the values
for a given number p, then for each smaller number we know a domain and values that answer
to the number; but only a ‘principle of choice’ could lead us to take a fixed system of values in
an infinite domain.” [Herbrand, 1971, p.165, translation by Dreben and Heijenoort]
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After defining the dual notion for unsatisfiability instead of validity, Herbrand continues:
“Il est absolument nécessaire de prendre de telles définitions, pour donner un
sens précis aux mots: ‘vrai dans un champ infini’, qui ont souvent été employés
sans explication suffisante, et pour justifier une proposition à laquelle on fait
souvent allusion, démontrée par Löwenheim,1 sans bien remarquer que cette
proposition n’a aucun sens précis sans définition préalable, et que la démonstra-
tion de Löwenheim est au surplus totalement insuffisante pour notre but (voir
6.4).”108
Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem equates provability with Property C, whereas the
Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem equates validity with Property C. Thus, it is not the case
that Herbrand somehow corrected Löwenheim. Instead, the Löwenheim–Skolem
Theorem and Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem had better be looked upon as a bridge
from validity to provability with two arcs and Property C as the eminent pillar in the middle
of the river, offering a magnificent view from the bridge on properties of first-order logic; as
depicted in § 12. And this was probably also Herbrand’s view when he correctly wrote:
“Nous pouvons dire que la démonstration de Löwenheim était suffisante en
Mathématiques; mais il nous a fallu, dans ce travail, la rendre ‘métamathéma-
tique’ (voir l’introduction), pour qu’elle nous soit de quelque utilité.”109
Moreover, Herbrand criticizes Löwenheim for not showing the consistency of first-order
logic, but this, of course, was never Löwenheim’s concern.
The mathematically substantial part of Herbrand’s critique of Löwenheim refers
to the use of the Axiom of Choice in Löwenheim’s proof of the Löwenheim–Skolem
Theorem.
108Cf. [Herbrand, 1930, p.110]. Without the signs after “définitions”, “mots”, and “préalable” and the
emphasis on “Löwenheim ”, but with the correct “6.2” instead of the misprint “6.4” also in: [Herbrand,
1968, p.136f.]
“It is absolutely necessary to adopt such definitions if we want to give a precise sense to the
words ‘true in an infinite domain’, words that have frequently been used without sufficient
explanation, and also if we want to justify a proposition proved by Löwenheim, a proposition
to which many refer without clearly seeing that Löwenheim’s proof is totally inadequate for our
purposes (see 6.4) and that, indeed, the proposition has no precise sense until such a definition
has been given.” [Herbrand, 1971, p.166, translated by Dreben and Heijenoort]
109Cf. [Herbrand, 1930, p.118]. Without the emphasis on “Löwenheim ” and with “mathématiques”
instead of “Mathématiques” and “l’Introduction)” instead of “l’introduction),” also in: [Herbrand, 1968,
p.144].
“We could say that Löwenheim’s proof was sufficient in mathematics; but, in the present work,
we had to make it ‘metamathematical’ (see Introduction) so that it would be of some use to
us.” [Herbrand, 1971, p.176, translated by Dreben and Heijenoort]
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The Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem as found in many textbooks, such as [Enderton,
1972, p.141], says that any satisfiable set of first-order formulas is satisfiable in a countable
structure. In [Löwenheim, 1915], however, we only find a dual statement, namely that any
invalid first-order formula has a denumerable counter-model. Moreover, what is actually
proved, read charitably,110 is the following stronger theorem:
Theorem 14.1 (Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem à la Löwenheim [1915])
Let us assume the Axiom of Choice. Let A be a first-order formula.
1. If A has Property C of order p for some positive natural number p, then |= A.
2. If A does not have Property C of order p for any positive natural number p, then we
can construct a sequence of partial structures Si that converges to a structure S ′ with
a denumerable universe such that 6|=S′ A. 
As Property C of order p can be effectively tested for p = 1, 2, 3, . . ., Löwenheim’s proof
provides us with a complete proof procedure which went unnoticed by Skolem as well as the
Hilbert school. Indeed, there is no mention in the discussion of the completeness problem
for first-order logic in [Hilbert & Ackermann, 1928, p. 68], where it is considered as an
open problem.111
Thus, for validity instead of provability, Gödel’s Completeness Theorem112 is contained
already in [Löwenheim, 1915]. Gödel has actually acknowledged this for the version of
the proof of the Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem in [Skolem, 1923b].113
Note that the convergence of the structures Si against S ′ in Theorem14.1 is hypothetical
in two aspects: First, as validity is not co-semi-decidable, in general we can never positively
know that we are actually in Case 2 of Theorem14.1, i.e. that a convergence toward S ′
exists. Second, even if we knew about the convergence toward S ′, we would have no
general procedure to find out which parts of Si will be actually found in S ′ and which will
be removed by backtracking. This makes it hard to get an intuition for S ′ and may be the
philosophical reason for Herbrand’s rejection of “falsehood in S ′ ” as a meaningful notion.
Mathematically, however, we see no justification in Herbrand’s rejection of this notion
and will explain this in the following.
110As Löwenheim’s paper lacks some minor details, there is an ongoing discussion whether its proof of
the Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem is complete and what is actually shown. Our reading of the proof of
the Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem in [Löwenheim, 1915] is a standard one. Only in [Skolem, 1941,
p. 26ff.] and [Badesa, 2004, § 6.3.4] we found an incompatible reading, namely that — to construct S ′
of item2 of Theorem14.1 — Löwenheim’s proof requires an additional falsifying structure of arbitrary
cardinality to be given in advance. The similarity of our presentation with Herbrand’s Fundamental
Theorem, however, is in accordance with [Skolem, 1941, p. 30], but not with [Badesa, 2004, p.145]. The
relation of Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem to the Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem is further discussed
in [Anellis, 1991]. Cf. also our Note 115.
111Actually, the completeness problem is slightly ill defined in [Hilbert & Ackermann, 1928]. Cf. e.g.
[Gödel, 1986ff., Vol. I, pp. 44–48].
112Cf. [Gödel, 1930].
113Letter of Gödel to Heijenoort, dated Aug. 14, 1964. Cf. [Heijenoort, 1971a, p. 510, Note i],
[Gödel, 1986ff., Vol. I, p. 51; Vol. V, pp. 315–317].
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Herbrand’s critical remark concerning the Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem is justified,
however, insofar as Löwenheim needs the Axiom of Choice at two steps in his proof without
mentioning this.
1st Step: To show the equivalence of a formula to its outer Skolemized form, Löwen-
heim’s proof requires the full Axiom of Choice.
2nd Step: For constructing the structure S ′, Löwenheim would need König’s Lemma,
which is a weak form of the Axiom of Choice.114
Contrary to the general perception,115 there are no essential gaps in Löwenheim’s proof,
with the exception of the implicit application of the Axiom of Choice, which was no excep-
tion at his time. Indeed, fifteen years later, Gödel still applies the Axiom of Choice tacitly
114König’s Lemma is Form10 in [Howard & Rubin, 1998]. This form is even weaker than the well-
known Principle of Dependent Choice, namely Form43 in [Howard & Rubin, 1998]; cf. also [Rubin &
Rubin, 1985].
115This perception is partly based on the unjustified criticism of Skolem, Herbrand, and Heijenoort.
We are not aware of any negative critique against [Löwenheim, 1915] at the time of publication. [Wang,
1970, p. 27ff.], proof-read by Bernays and Gödel, after being most critical with the proof in [Skolem,
1923b], sees no gaps in Löwenheim’s proof, besides the applications of the Axiom of Choice. The same
holds for [Brady, 2000, § 8], sharing expertise in the Peirce–Schröder tradition59 with Löwenheim.
Let us have a look at the criticism of Skolem, Herbrand, and Heijenoort in detail:
The following statement of Skolem on [Löwenheim, 1915] is confirmed in [Heijenoort, 1971a, p. 230]:
“Er muss also sozusagen einen Umweg über das Nichtabzählbare machen.”
[Skolem, 1923b, p. 220]
“Thus he must make a detour, so to speak, through the non-denumerable.”
[Heijenoort, 1971a, p. 293, translation by Stefan Bauer-Mengelberg]
That detour, however, is not an essential part of the proof, but serves for the purpose of illustration only.
This is clear from the original paper and also the conclusion in [Badesa, 2004, §§ 3.2 and 3.3].
When Herbrand criticizes Löwenheim’s proof, he actually does not criticize the proof as such, but only
Löwenheim’s semantical notions; even though Herbrand’s verbalization suggests the opposite, especially
in [Herbrand, 1931, Chapter 2], where Herbrand repeats Löwenheim’s reducibility results in finitistic
style:
“Löwenheim [1915] a publié du résultat énoncé dans ce paragraphe une démonstration dont
nous avons montré les graves lacunes dans notre travail déjà cité (Chapter 5, § 6.2).”
[Herbrand, 1968, p. 187, Note 29]
“Löwenheim [1915] published a proof of the result stated in this section. In [Herbrand,
1930, Chapter 5, § 6.2], we pointed out that there are serious gaps in his proof.”
[Herbrand, 1971, p. 237, Note 33, translation by Dreben and Heijenoort]
Heijenoort realized that there is a missing step in Löwenheim’s proof:
“What has to be proved is that, from the assignments thus obtained for all i, there can be
formed one assignment such that ΠF is true, that is, ΠF = 0 is false. This Löwenheim
does not do.” [Heijenoort, 1971a, p. 231]
Except for the principle of choice, however, the missing step is trivial because in Löwenheim’s presentation
the already fixed part of the assignment is irrelevant for the extension. Indeed, in the “Note to the Second
Printing”, in the preface of the 2nd printing, Heijenoort partially corrected himself:
“I am now inclined to think that Löwenheim came closer to König’s Lemma than his paper,
on the surface, suggests. But a rewriting of my introductory note on that point (p. 231) will
have to wait for another occasion.” [Heijenoort, 1971a, p. ix]
This correction is easily overlooked because no note was inserted into the actual text.
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in the proof of his Completeness Theorem.116 Moreover, as none of these theorems state any
consistency properties, from the point of view of Hilbert’s finitism there was no reason
to avoid the application of the Axiom of Choice. Indeed, in the proof of his Completeness
Theorem, Gödel “is not interested in avoiding an appeal to the Axiom of Choice.”117
Thus, again, as we already noted in item2 of § 3, regarding finitism, Herbrand is more
royalist than King Hilbert.
The proof of the Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem in [Skolem, 1920] already avoids the
Axiom of Choice in the 1st Step by using Skolem normal form instead of Skolemized
form.118 Moreover, in [Skolem, 1923b], the choices in the 2nd Step of the proof become
deterministic, so that no form of the Axiom of Choice (such as König’s Lemma) is needed
anymore. This is achieved by taking the universe of the structure S ′ to be the natural
numbers and by using the well-ordering of the natural numbers.
Theorem 14.2 (Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem à la [Skolem, 1923b])
Let Γ be a (finite of infinite) denumerable set of first-order formulas. Assume 6|= Γ .
Without assuming any form of the Axiom of Choice we can construct a sequence of partial
structures Si that converges to a structure S ′ with a universe which is a subset of the natural
numbers such that 6|=S′ Γ . 
Note that Herbrand does not need any form of the Axiom of Choice for the following
reasons: In the 1st Step, Herbrand does not use the semantics of Skolemized forms
at all, because Herbrand’s Skolem terms are just names for free variables, cf. § 12.
In the 2nd Step, Herbrand’s peculiar notion of “falsehood in an infinite domain” makes
any choice superfluous. This is a device which — contrary to what Herbrand wrote —
is not really necessary to avoid the Axiom of Choice, as the above Theorem14.2 shows.
In this way, Herbrand came close to proving the completeness of Russell’s and
Hilbert’s calculi for first-order logic, but he did not trust the left arc of the bridge depicted
in § 12. And thus Gödel proved it first when he submitted his thesis in 1929, in the same
year as Herbrand, and the theorem is now called Gödel’s Completeness Theorem in all
textbooks on logic.119
116Cf. [Gödel, 1930].
117Cf. [Wang, 1970, p. 24].
118To achieve Skolem normal form, Skolem defines predicates for the subformulas starting with a
γ-quantifier, and then rewrites the formula into a prenex form with a first-order γ∗δ∗-prefix.122 By defi-
nition, Skolemized forms have a δ∗γ∗-prefix with an implicit higher-order δ∗, and raising is the dual of
Skolemization which produces a γ∗δ∗-prefix with a higher-order γ∗, cf. [Miller, 1992]. The Skolem
normal form, however, has a γ∗δ∗-prefix with first-order γ∗.
119Cf. [Gödel, 1930].
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It is also interesting to note that Herbrand does not know how to construct a counter-
model without using the Axiom of Choice, as explicitly described in [Skolem, 1923b].
This is — on the one hand — a strong indication that Herbrand was not aware of
[Skolem, 1923b].120 On the other hand, Herbrand names Skolem’s Paradox several
times and [Skolem, 1923b; 1929] seem to be the only written sources of this atHerbrand’s
time.121
As Herbrand’s Property C and its use of the outer Skolemized form are most similar
to the treatment in [Skolem, 1928],122 it seems likely that Herbrand had read [Skolem,
1928]. Without giving any justification, Heijenoort assumes, however, that
“He was not acquainted either, certainly, with [Skolem, 1928].”
[Heijenoort, 1986c, p.112]
120Cf. p.12 of Goldfarb’s introduction in [Herbrand, 1971].
121Skolem’s Paradox is also briefly mentioned in [Neumann, 1925], not as a paradox, however, but as
unfavorable conclusions on set theory drawn by Skolem, who wrote about a “peculiar and apparently
paradoxical state of affairs”, cf. [Heijenoort, 1971a, p. 295].
122Note that the Skolemized form is used in [Löwenheim, 1915], [Skolem, 1928], and [Herbrand,
1930], whereas it is used neither in [Skolem, 1920], nor in [Skolem, 1923b], which use Skolem normal
form instead.
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15 Herbrand’s First Proof of the
Consistency of Arithmetic
Consider a signature of arithmetic that consists only of zero ‘0’, the successor function ‘s’,
and the equality predicate ‘=’. Besides the axioms of equality (equivalence and substi-
tutability), Herbrand considers several subsets of the following axioms:123
(S) P (0) ∧ ∀y.
(
P (y) ⇒ P (s(y))
)
⇒ ∀x. P (x)
(nat1) x= 0 ∨ ∃y. x= s(y)
(nat2) s(x) 6= 0
(nat3) s(x) = s(y) ⇒ x= y
(nat4+i) s
i+1(x) 6=x
Axiom (nat1) together with the well-foundedness of the successor relation ‘s’ specifies the
natural numbers up to isomorphism.124 So do the Peano axioms (nat2) and (nat3) together
with the Peano axiom of Structural Induction (S), provided that the meta variable P is
seen as a universally quantified second-order variable with the standard interpretation.125
Of course, Herbrand, the finitist, does not even mention these second-order properties.
His discussion is restricted to decidable first-order axiom sets, some of which are infinite
because of the inclusion of the infinite sequence (nat4), (nat5), (nat6), . . .
As Herbrand’s axiom sets are first order, they cannot specify the natural numbers
up to isomorphism.126 But as the model of arithmetic is infinite, Herbrand, the finitist,
cannot accept it as part of his proof theory. Actually, he never even mentions any infinite
model of arithmetic.
Herbrand shows that (for the poor signature of 0, s, and =) the first-order theory of
the axioms (nati)i≥1 (i.e. (nati) for any positive natural number i) is consistent, complete,
and decidable. His constructive proof is elegant, provides a lucid operative understanding
of basic arithmetic, and has been included inter alia into § 3.1 of [Enderton, 1972], one of
the most widely used textbooks on logic. Herbrand’s proof has two constructive steps:
1st Step: He shows how to rewrite any formula into an equivalent quantifier-free formula
without additional free variables. He proceeds by a special form of quantifier elimi-
nation, a technique in the Peirce–Schröder tradition59 with its first explicit occur-
rence in [Skolem, 1919].127
123The labels are ours, not Herbrand’s. Herbrand writes ‘x+1’ instead of ‘s(x)’. To save the axiom
of substitutability, Herbrand actually uses the biconditional in (nat3).
124Cf. [Wirth, 2004, § 1.1.3]. This idea goes back to [Pieri, 1907/8].
125Cf. e.g. [Andrews, 2002].
126For instance, because of the Upward Löwenheim–Skolem–Tarski Theorem. Cf. e.g. [Enderton,
1972].
127More precisely, cf. [Skolem, 1919, § 4]. For more information on the subject of quantifier elimination
in this context, cf. [Anellis, 1992, p.120f., Note 33], [Wang, 1970, p. 33].
48
2nd Step: He shows that the quantifier-free fragment is consistent and decidable and does
not depend on the axiom (nat1). This is achieved with a procedure which rewrites a
quantifier-free formula into an equivalent disjunctive normal form without additional
free variables. For any quantifier-free formula B, this normal-form procedure satisfies:
(nati)i≥2 ⊢ B iff the normal form of ¬B is 0 6= 0.
This elegant work of Herbrand is hardly discussed in the secondary literature, probably
because — as a decidability result — it became obsolete before it was published, because
of the analogous result for this theory extended with addition, the so-called Presburger
Arithmetic, as it is known today. Mojżesz Presburger (1904–1943?)128 gave his talk on
the decidability of his theory with similar techniques on Sept. 24, 1929,129 five months after
Herbrand finished his PhD thesis. As Tarski’s work on decision methods developed in
his 1927/8 lectures in Warszawa also did not appear in print until after World War II,130
we have to consider this contribution of Herbrand as completely original. Indeed:
“Dieses gelingt nach einer Methode, welche unabhängig voneinander J.
Herbrand und M. Presburger ausgebildet haben. Diese Methode besteht
darin, dass man Formeln, welche gebundene Variablen enthalten,
’
Reduzierte‘
zuordnet, in denen keine gebundenen Variablen mehr auftreten und welche im
Sinne der inhaltlichen Deutung jenen Formeln gleichwertig sind.”131
In addition, Herbrand gives a constructive proof that the first-order theories given by the
following two axiom sets are identical:
• (nati)i≥1
• (nat2), (nat3), and the first-order instances of (S), provided that (S) is taken as a
first-order axiom scheme instead of a second-order axiom.
128Presburger’s true name is Prezburger. He was a student of Alfred Tarski, Jan Łukasie-
wicz (1878–1956), Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1890–1963), and Kazimierz Kuratowski (1896–1980) in
Warszawa. He was awarded a master (not a PhD) in mathematics on Oct. 7, 1930. As he was of Jewish
parentage, it is likely that he died in the Holocaust (Shoah), maybe in 1943. Cf. [Zygmunt, 1991].
129Moreover, note that [Presburger, 1930] did not appear in print before 1930. Some citations date
[Presburger, 1930] at 1927, 1928, and 1929. There is evidence, however, that these earlier datings are
wrong, cf. [Stanisfer, 1984], [Zygmunt, 1991].
130Cf. [Stanisfer, 1984], [Tarski, 1951].
131Cf. [Hilbert & Bernays, 1934, p. 234] (or [Hilbert & Bernays, 1968, p. 233]) (note-mark omitted,
orthography modernized).
“This is achieved by a method developed independently by J. Herbrand and M. Presburger.
The method consists in associating ‘reduced forms’ to formulas with bound variables, in which
no bound variables occur anymore and which are semantically equivalent to the original for-
mulas.”
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16 Herbrand’s Second Proof of the
Consistency of Arithmetic
Herbrand’s contributions to logic discussed so far are all published in Herbrand’s thesis.
In this section, we consider his journal publication [Herbrand, 1932a] as well as some
material from Chapter 4 of his thesis.
First, the signature is now enriched to include the recursive functions, cf. § 17 below.
Second, the axiom scheme (S) is restricted to just those instances which result from replacing
the meta variable P with quantifier-free first-order formulas. For this setting, Herbrand
again gives a constructive proof of consistency. This proof consists of the following two
steps:
1st Step: Herbrand defines recursive functions fP such that fP (x) is the least natural
number y ≤ x such that ¬P (y) holds, provided that such a y exists, and 0 otherwise.
The functions fP are primitive recursive unless the terms substituted for P contain a
non-primitive recursive function. These functions imply the instances of (S), rendering
them redundant. This is similar to the effect of Hilbert’s 2nd ε-formula:132
εx.¬P (x) = s(y) ⇒ P (y),
Herbrand’s procedure, however, is much simpler but only applicable to quantifier-
free P .
2nd Step: Consider the universal closures of the axioms of equality, the axioms (nat2) and
(nat3), and an arbitrary finite subset of the axioms for recursive functions. Take the
negation of the conjunction of all these formulas. As all quantified variables of the
resulting formula are γ-variables, this is already in Skolemized form. Moreover, for
any positive natural number n, it is easy to show that this formula does not have
Property C of order n: Indeed, we just have to construct a proper finite substructure
of arithmetic which satisfies all the considered axioms for the elements of Tn. Thus,
by Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem, consistency is immediate.
The 2nd step is a prototypical example to demonstrate how Herbrand’s Fundamental
Theorem helps to answer seemingly non-finitistic semantical questions on infinite struc-
tures with the help of infinitely many finite sub-structures. Note that such a semantical
argumentation is finitistically acceptable if and only if the structures are all finite and
effectively constructible. And the latter is always the case for Herbrand’s work on logic.
As the theory of all recursive functions is sufficiently expressive, there is the question
why Herbrand’s second consistency proof does not imply the inconsistency of arithmetic
by Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem? Herbrand explains that we cannot have
the theory of all total recursive functions because they are not recursively enumerable.
More precisely, an evaluation function for an enumerable set of recursive functions cannot
be contained in this set by the standard diagonalization argument.
132Cf. e.g. [Hilbert & Bernays, 1970, § 2.3, p. 82ff.; SupplementVB, p. 535ff.].
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Hilbert’s school had failed to prove the consistency of arithmetic, except for the special
case that for the axiom (S), the variable x does not occur within the scope of any binder
in P (x).133 But this fragment of arithmetic is actually equivalent to the one considered by
Herbrand here.134 In this sense, Herbrand’s result on the consistency of arithmetic was
just as strong as the one of the Hilbert school by ε-substitution. Herbrand’s means,
however, are much simpler.135
133Cf. e.g. [Hilbert & Bernays, 1939, § 2.4].
More precisely,Hilbert’s school had failed to prove the termination of their first algorithm for computing
a valuation of the ε-terms in the 1st and 2nd ε-formulas. This de facto failure was less spectacular but
internally more discouraging for Hilbert’s program than Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem with
its restricted area of application, cf. [Gödel, 1931].
Only after developing a deeper understanding of the notion of a basic typus of an ε-term (Grundtypus;
introduced in [Neumann, 1927]; called ε-matrix in [Scanlon, 1973]) and especially of the independence
of its valuation of the valuations of its sub-ordinate ε-expressions, has the problem been resolved: The
termination problem was cured in [Ackermann, 1940] with the help of a second algorithm of ε-valuation,
terminating within the ordinal number ǫ0, just as Gentzen’s consistency proofs for full arithmetic in
[Gentzen, 1936; 1938; 1943].
134Cf. [Kleene, 1952, p. 474].
135Herbrand’s results on the consistency of arithmetic have little importance, however, for today’s
inductive theorem proving because the restrictions on (S) can usually not be met in practice. Herbrand’s
restrictions on (S) require us to avoid the occurrence of x in the scope of quantifiers in P (x). In practice
of inductive theorem proving, this is hardly a problem for the γ-quantifiers, whose bound variables tend to
be easily replaceable with witnessing terms. There is a problem, however, with the δ-quantifiers. If we
remove the δ-quantifiers, letting their bound δ-variables become free δ-variables, the induction hypothesis
typically becomes too weak for proving the induction step. This is because the now free δ-variables do not
admit different instantiation in the induction hypotheses and the induction conclusion.
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17 Foreshadowing Recursive Functions
Herbrand’s notion of a recursive function is quite abstract: A recursive function is given
by any new ni-ary function symbol fi plus a set of quantifier-free formulas for its specification
(which Herbrand calls the hypotheses), such that, for any natural numbers k1, . . . , kni,
there is a constructive proof of the unique existence of a natural number l such that
⊢ fi(s
k1(0), . . . , skni (0)) = sl(0).
“On pourra aussi introduire un nombre quelconque de
fonctions fix1x2 · · ·xni avec des hypothèses telles que:
a) Elles ne contiennent pas de variables apparentes.
b) Considérées intuitionnistiquement,5 elles permettent de faire effectivement
le calcul de fix1x2 · · ·xni, pour tout système particulier de nombres; et l’on
puisse démontrer intuitionnistiquement que l’on obtient un résultat bien
déterminé. (GroupeC.)
5Cette expression signifie: traduites en language ordinaire, considérées comme une propriété
des entiers, et non comme un pur symbole.”
[Herbrand, 1932a, p. 5]136
In the letter to Gödel dated April 7, 1931, mentioned already in § 2, Herbrand added
the requirement that the hypotheses defining fi contain only function symbols fj with j≤i,
for natural numbers i and j.137
Gödel’s version of Herbrand’s notion of a recursive function is a little different:
He speaks of quantifier-free equations instead of quantifier-free formulas and explicitly lists
the already known functions, but omits the computability of the functions:
“If φ denotes an unknown function and ψ1, . . . , ψk are known functions, and if
the ψ’s and the φ are substituted in one another in the most general fashions
and certain pairs of the resulting expressions are equated, then, if the resulting
set of functional equations has one and only one solution for φ, φ is a recursive
function.”138
136Without the colon after “que” and the comma after “fix1x2 · · ·xni ”, with a semi-colon instead of a
full-stop after “apparentes”, and with “langage” instead of “language” also in: [Herbrand, 1968, p. 226f.]
“We can also introduce any number of functions fi(x1, x2, . . . , xni) together with some hypo-
theses such that
(a) The hypotheses contain no bound variables.
(b) Considered intuitionistically,5 they make the effective computation of the fi(x1, x2, . . . , xni)
possible for every given set of numbers, and it is possible to prove intuitionistically that we
obtain a well-defined result. (Group C.)
5This expression means: translated into ordinary language, considered as a property of integers
and not as a mere symbol.”
137Cf. [Gödel, 1986ff., Vol. V, pp. 14–21], [Sieg, 2005].
138Cf. [Gödel, 1934, p. 26], also in: [Gödel, 1986ff., Vol. I, p. 368].
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Gödel took this paragraph on page 26 of his 1934 Princeton lectures from the above-
mentioned letter from Herbrand to Gödel, which Gödel considered to be lost, but
which was rediscovered in February 1986.139 In 1963, Gödel wrote to Heijenoort:
“I have never met Herbrand. His suggestion was made in a letter in 1931,
and it was formulated exactly as on p. 26 of my lecture notes, that is, without
any reference to computability. However, since Herbrand was an intuitionist,
this definition for him evidently meant that there is a constructive proof for the
existence and uniqueness of φ.”140
As we have seen, however, Gödel’s memory was wrong insofar as he had added the re-
striction to equations and omitted the computability requirement.
Obviously, Herbrand had a clear idea of our current notion of a total recursive function.
Herbrand’s characterization, however, just transfers the recursiveness of the meta level to
the object level. Such a transfer is of little epistemological value. While there seems to be
no way to do much more than such a transfer for consistency of arithmetic in Gödelizable
systems (because of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem), it is well possible to do
more than that for the notion of recursive functions. Indeed, in the later developments of
the theory of term rewriting systems and the today standard recursion theory for total and
partial recursive functions, we find constructive definitions and consistency proofs prac-
tically useful in programming and inductive theorem proving.141 Thus, as suggested by
Gödel,142 we may say that Herbrand foreshadowed the notion of a recursive function,
although he did not introduce it.143
139Cf. [Dawson, 1993].
140Letter of Gödel dated April 23, 1963. Cf. [Herbrand, 1971, p. 283], also in: [Heijenoort, 1986c,
p.115f.], also in: [Gödel, 1986ff., Vol. V, p. 308].
It is not clear whether Gödel refers to Brouwer’s intuitionism or Hilbert’s finitism when he calls
Herbrand an “intuitionist” here; cf. § 3.
And there is more confusion regarding the meaning of two occurrences of the word “intuitionistically”
on the page of the above quotation from [Herbrand, 1932a]. Both occurrences carry the same note-
mark, probably because Herbrand realized that this time he uses the word with even a another meaning,
different from his own standard and different from its meaning for the other occurrence in the same quota-
tion: It neither refers to Brouwer’s intuitionism nor to Hilbert’s finitism, but actually to the working
mathematician’s meta level as opposed to the object level of his studies; cf. e.g. [Neumann, 1927, p. 2f.].
141Partial recursive functions were introduced in [Kleene, 1938]. For consistency proofs and admissibility
conditions for the practical specification of partial recursive functions with positive/negative-conditional
term rewriting systems cf. [Wirth, 2009].
142Letter of Gödel to Heijenoort, dated Aug. 14, 1964. Cf. [Heijenoort, 1986c, p.115f.].
143Cf. [Heijenoort, 1986c, p.115ff.] for more on this. Moreover, note that a general definition of
(total) recursive functions was not required for Herbrand’s second consistency proof because Herbrand’s
function fP of § 16 is actually a primitive recursive one, unless P contains a non-primitive recursive function.
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18 Herbrand’s Influence on Automated Deduction and
Herbrand’s Unification Algorithm
In the last fifty years the field of automated deduction, or automated reasoning as it is
more generally called today, has come a long way: modern deduction systems are among
the most sophisticated and complex human artifacts we have, they can routinely search
spaces of several million formulas to find a proof. Automated theorem proving systems
have solved open mathematical problems and these deduction engines are used nowadays
in many subareas of computer science and artificial intelligence, including software devel-
opment and verification as well as security analysis. The application in industrial software
and hardware development is now standard practice in most high quality products. The
handbook [Robinson & Voronkow, 2001] gives a good impression of the state of the
art today.
Herbrand’s work inspired the development of the first computer programs for auto-
mated deduction and mechanical theorem proving, for the following reason: The actual test
for Herbrand’s Property C is very mechanical in nature and thus can be carried out on a
computer, resulting in a mechanical semi-decision procedure for any mathematical theorem!
This insight, first articulated in the 1950s, turned out to be most influential in automated
reasoning, artificial intelligence, and computer science.
Let us recapitulate the general idea as it is common now in most monographs and intro-
ductory textbooks on automated theorem proving.
Suppose we are given a conjecture A. Let F be its Skolemized form; cf. § 8. We then
eliminate all quantifiers in F, and the result is a quantifier-free formula E. We now have to
show that the Herbrand disjunction over some possible values of the free variables of E
is valid. See also Example 10.2 in § 10.
How do we find these values? Well, we do not actually have these “objects in the
domain”, but we can use their names, i.e. we take all terms from the Herbrand universe
and substitute them in a systematic way into the variables and wait what happens: every
substituted formula obtained that way is sentential, so we can just check whether their
disjunction is valid or not with one of the many available decision procedures for sentential
logic. If it is valid, we are done: the original formula A must be valid by Herbrand’s
Fundamental Theorem. If the disjunction of instantiated sentential formulas turns out to
be invalid, well, then bad luck and we continue the process of substituting terms from the
Herbrand universe.
This process must terminate, if indeed the original theorem is valid. But what happens
if the given conjecture is in fact not a theorem? In that case the process will either run
forever or sometimes, if we are lucky, we can nevertheless show this to be the case.
In the following we will present these general ideas a little more technically.144
144Standard textbooks covering the early period of automated deduction are [Chang & Lee, 1973] and
[Loveland, 1978]. Chang & Lee [1973] present this and other algorithms in more detail and rigor.
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Arithmetic provided a testbed for the first automated theorem proving program: In 1954
the program of Martin Davis (*1928) proved the exciting theorem that the sum of two
even numbers is again even. This date is still considered a hallmark and was used as
the date for the 50th anniversary of automated reasoning in 2004. The system that proved
this and other theorems was based on Presburger Arithmetic, a decidable fragment of
first-order logic, mentioned already in § 15.
Another approach, based directly on Herbrand’s ideas, was tried by Paul C. Gilmore
(*1925).145 His program worked as follows: A preprocessor generated the Herbrand
disjunction in the following sense. The formula E contains finitely many constant and
function symbols, which are used to systematically generate the Herbrand universe for
this set; say
a, b, f(a, a), f(a, b), f(b, a), f(b, b), g(a, a), g(a, b), g(b, a), g(b, b), f(a, f(a, a)), . . .
for the constants a, b and the binary function symbols f, g. The terms of this universe were
enumerated and systematically substituted for the variables in E such that the program
generates a sequence of propositional formulas Eσ1, Eσ2, . . . where σ1, σ2, . . . are the sub-
stitutions. Now each of these sets can be checked for truth-functional validity, for which
Gilmore used the “multiplication method”. This method computes the conjunctive nor-
mal form146 and checks the individual elements of this conjunction in turn: If any element
contains the disjunction of an atom and its negation, it must be true and hence can be
removed from the overall conjunction. As soon as all disjunctions have been removed, the
theorem is proved — else it goes on forever.
This method is not particularly efficient and served to prove a few very simple theorems
only. Such algorithms became known as British Museum Algorithms. That name was
originally justified as follows:
“Thus we reflect the basic nature of theorem proving; that is, its nature prior
to building up sophisticated proof techniques. We will call this algorithm the
British Museum Algorithm, in recognition of the supposed originators of this
type.” [Newell &al., 1957]
The name has found several more popular explanations since. The nicest is the following:
If monkeys are placed in front of typewriters and they type in a guaranteed random fashion,
they will reproduce all the books of the library of the British Museum, provided they could
type long enough.
145Cf. [Gilmore, 1960]. The idea is actually due to Löwenheim and Skolem besides Herbrand, as
discussed in detail in § 14 .
146Actually, the historic development of automated theorem proving did not follow Herbrand but
Skolem in choosing the duality validity–unsatisfiability. Thus, instead of proving validity of a conjec-
ture, the task was to show unsatisfiability of the negated conjecture. For this reason, Gilmore actually
used the disjunctive normal form here.
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A few months later Martin Davis and Hilary Putnam (*1926) experimented with a
better idea, where the multiplication method is replaced by what is now known as the
Davis–Putnam procedure.147 It works as follows: the initial formula E is transformed
(once and for all) into disjunctive normal form and then the variables are systematically
replaced by terms from the Herbrand universe as before. But now the truth-functional
check is replaced with a very effective procedure, which constituted a huge improvement
and is still used today in many applications involving propositional logic.148 However, the
most cumbersome aspect remained: the systematic but blind replacement of variables by
terms from the Herbrand universe. Could we not find these replacements in a more
goal-directed and intelligent way?
The first step in that direction was done byDavis [1963] in a method called linked conjuncts,
where the substitution was cleverly chosen, so that it generated the desired tautologies more
directly. And this idea finally led to the seminal resolution principle discovered by J. Alan
Robinson (*1930?), which dominated the field ever since.149
This technique — called a machine-oriented logic by Robinson — dispenses with
the systematic replacement from the Herbrand universe altogether and finds the proper
substitutions more directly by an ingenious combination of Cut and a unification algorithm.
It works as follows: first transform the formula E into disjunctive normal form, i.e. into
a disjunctive set of conjunctions. Now suppose that the following elements are in this
disjunctive set:
K1 ∧ . . . ∧ Km ∧ L and ¬L ∧ M1 ∧ . . . ∧ Mn.
Then we can add their resolvent
K1 ∧ . . . ∧ Km ∧ M1 ∧ . . . ∧ Mn
to this disjunction, simply because one of the previous two must be true if the resolvent is
true.
Now suppose that the literals L and ¬L are not yet complementary because they still
contain variables, for example such as P (x, f(a, y)) and ¬P (a, f(z, b)). It is easy to see,
that these two atoms can be made equal, if we substitute a for the variables x and z and the
constant b for the variable y. The most important aspect of the resolution principle is that
this substitution can be computed by an algorithm, which is called unification. Moreover,
there is always at most one (up to renaming) most general substitution which unifies two
atoms, and this single unifier stands for the potentially infinitely many instances from the
Herbrand universe that would be generated otherwise.
Robinson’s original unification algorithm is exponential in time and space. The race for
the fastest unification algorithm lasted more than a quarter of a century and resulted in
a linear algorithm and unification theory became a (small) subfield of computer science,
artificial intelligence, logic, and universal algebra.150
147Cf. [Davis & Putnam, 1960].
148Cf. The international SAT Competitions web page http://www.satcompetition.org/.
149Cf. [Robinson, 1965].
150Cf. [Siekmann, 1989] for a survey.
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Unification theory had its heyday in the late 1980s, when the Japanese challenged the
Western economies with the “Fifth Generation Computer Program” which was based among
others on logical programming languages. The processors of these machines realized an
ultrafast unification algorithm cast in silicon, whose performance was measured not in
MIPS (machine instructions per second), as with standard computers, but in LIPS (logical
inferences per second, which amounts to the number of unifications per second). A myriad
of computing machinery was built in special hardware or software on these new concepts
and most industrial countries even founded their own research laboratories to counteract
the Japanese challenge.151
Interestingly, Jacques Herbrand had seen the concept of a unifying substitution and an
algorithm already in his thesis in 1929. Here is his account in the original French idiom:
“10. Si une des égalités à satisfaire égale une variable restreinte x à un autre
individu; ou bien cet individu contient x, et on ne peut y satisfaire; ou
bien il ne contient pas x; cette égalité sera alors une des égalités normales
cherchées; et on remplacera x par cette fonction dans les autres égalités à
satisfaire.
20. Si une des égalités à satisfaire égale une variable générale à un autre indi-
vidu, qui ne soit pas une variable restreinte, il est impossible d’y satisfaire.
30. Si une des égalités à satisfaire égale
f1(ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕn) à f2(ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψm),
ou bien les fonctions élémentaires f1 et f2 sont différentes, auquel cas il
es impossible d’y satisfaire; ou bien les fonctions f1 et f2 sont les mêmes;
auquel cas on remplace l’égalité par celles obtenues en égalant ϕi à ψi.”152
151Such as the European Computer-Industry Research Center (ECRC), which was supported by the French
company Bull, the German Siemens company, and the British company ICL.
152Cf. [Herbrand, 1930, p. 96f.]. Note that the reprint in [Herbrand, 1968, p.124] has “associées”
instead of “normales”, which is not an improvement, and the English translation of [Herbrand, 1971,
p.148] is based on this contorted version.
“1. If one of the equations to be satisfied equates a γ-variable xγ to another term; either this term
contains xγ, and then the equation cannot be satisfied; or else the term does not contain xγ,
and then the equation will be one of the normal-form equations we are looking for, and
we replace xγ with the term in the other equations to be satisfied.
2. If one of the equations to be satisfied equates a δ-variable to another term that is not a
γ-variable, the equation cannot be satisfied.
3. If one of the equations to be satisfied equates f1(ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕn) to f2(ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψm); either
the function symbols f1 and f2 are different, and then the equation cannot be satisfied;
or they are the same, and then we replace this equation with those that equate ϕi to ψi.”
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19 Conclusion
With regard to students interested in logic, in the previous lectures we have presented all
major contributions of Jacques Herbrand to logic, and our 150 notes give hints on where
to continue studying.
With regard to historians, we uncovered some parts of the historical truth onHerbrand
which was varnished by contemporaries such as Gödel and Heijenoort. It was already
well-known that Gödel’s memories on Herbrand’s recursive functions were incorrect,
but to the best of our knowledge the errors of the reprint of Herbrand’s PhD thesis
[Herbrand, 1930] in [Herbrand, 1968] have not been noted before. The English trans-
lation in [Herbrand, 1971] is based on this contorted reprint: The advantage of working
with the original prints should become obvious from a comparison of our translation of
Herbrand’s unification algorithm in Note 152 with the translation in [Herbrand, 1971].
With regard to logicians, however, notwithstanding our above critique, the elaborately
commented book [Herbrand, 1971] is a great achievement and still the best source on
Herbrand as a logician (cf. Note 52), and our lectures would not have been possible
without Heijenoort’s most outstanding and invaluable contributions to this subject.
To the best of our knowledge, what we called Heijenoort’s correction of Herbrand’s
“False Lemma” has not been published before, and we have included it into our version of
Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem. The consequences of this correction on Herbrand’s
Modus Ponens elimination (as described in § 13) are most relevant still today and should
become part of the standard knowledge on logic, just as Gentzen’s Cut elimination.
While Herbrand’s important work on decidability and consistency of arithmetic was
soon to be topped by Presburger and Gentzen, his Fundamental Theorem will re-
main of outstanding historical and practical significance. Even under the critical assump-
tions (cf. the discussion in § 14) that Herbrand took the outer Skolemized form from
[Skolem, 1928] and that he had realized that the presentation in [Löwenheim, 1915]
included a sound and complete proof procedure, Herbrand’s Fundamental Theorem re-
mains a truly remarkable creation.
All in all, Jacques Herbrand has well deserved to be the idol that he actually is.
And thus we were surprised to find out how little is known on his personality and life, and
that there does not seem to be anything like a Herbrand memorial or museum, nor even
a street named after him, nor a decent photo of him available in the Internet.153 Moreover,
a careful bilingual edition of Herbrand’s complete works on the basis of the elaborate
previous editorial achievements is in high demand.154
153The best photos of Herbrand currently to be found in the Internet seem to be the one of Figures 2, 3,
and 4. Outside mathematics, Google hits on Herbrand typically refer to P. Herbrand & Cie., a historical
street-car production company in Cologne; or else to Herbrand Street close toRussell Square in London,
probably named after Herbrand Arthur Russell, the 11th Duke of Bedford.
154Cf. also Note 52.
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Figure 2: Photo of Jacques Herbrand on the expedition during which he found his
death.
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Bibliography of Jacques Herbrand
• To the best of our knowledge, the following bibliography of Jacques Herbrand is
complete, with the exception of his letters in [Gödel, 1986ff., Vol.V, pp. 3–25] and
[Roquette, 2013].
• Note that for labels of the form [Herbrand . . . ], we have maintained the standard
labeling as introduced by Jean van Heijenoort in [Herbrand, 1968; 1971] and
[Heijenoort, 1971a] as far as appropriate. For instance, Herbrand’s thesis is cited
as [Herbrand, 1930] and not as [Herbrand, 1930a], which would be in general
preferable because of the additional redundancy.
Joint Publications of Jacques Herbrand
[Chevalley & Herbrand, 1931] Claude Chevalley and Jacques Herbrand. Groupes
topologiques, groupes fuchsiens, groupes libres. Comptes rendus hebdomadaires des
séances de l’Académie des Sciences (Paris), 192:724–726, 1931.
[Herbrand & Chevalley, 1931] Jacques Herbrand and Claude Chevalley. Nouvelle dé-
monstration du théorème d’existence en théorie du corps de classes. Comptes rendus
hebdomadaires des séances de l’Académie des Sciences (Paris), 193:814–815, 1931.
Publications of Jacques Herbrand as Single Author
[Herbrand, 1928] Jacques Herbrand. Sur la théorie de la démonstration. Comptes rendus
hebdomadaires des séances de l’Académie des Sciences (Paris), 186:1274–1276, 1928. Also
in [Herbrand, 1968, pp. 21–23]. Annotated English translation On Proof Theory by
Warren Goldfarb with an extended note by Burton Dreben and Goldfarb in
[Herbrand, 1971, pp. 29–34].
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[Herbrand, 1929] Jacques Herbrand. Non-contradiction des axiomes arithmétiques.
Comptes rendus hebdomadaires des séances de l’Académie des Sciences (Paris), 188:303–
304, 1929. Also in [Herbrand, 1968, pp. 25–26]. Annotated English translation The
Consistency of the Axioms of Arithmetic by Warren Goldfarb in [Herbrand, 1971,
pp. 35–37]. (An abstract of [Herbrand, 1930, Chapter 4]).
[Herbrand, 1929a] Jacques Herbrand. Sur quelques propriétés des propositions vraies
et leurs applications. Comptes rendus hebdomadaires des séances de l’Académie des
Sciences (Paris), 188:1076–1078, 1929. Also in [Herbrand, 1968, pp. 27–29]. Annotated
English translation On several properties of true propositions and their applications by
Warren Goldfarb in [Herbrand, 1971, pp. 38–40]. (An abstract of [Herbrand,
1930, Chapter 5, § 6]).
[Herbrand, 1929b] Jacques Herbrand. Sur le probléme fondamental des mathématiques.
Comptes rendus hebdomadaires des séances de l’Académie des Sciences (Paris), 189:554–
556+720, 1929. Also in [Herbrand, 1968, pp. 31–33]. Annotated English translation
On the Fundamental Problem of Mathematics by Warren Goldfarb in [Herbrand,
1971, pp. 41–43]. (An abstract of [Herbrand, 1931]).
[Herbrand, 1929c] Jacques Herbrand. Recherche des solutions bornées de certaines équa-
tions fonctionnelles. Comptes rendus hebdomadaires des séances de l’Académie des Sci-
ences (Paris), 189:669–671, 811, 1929.
[Herbrand, 1930] Jacques Herbrand. Recherches sur la théorie de la démonstration. PhD
thesis, Université de Paris, 1930. Thèses présentées à la faculté des Sciences de Paris
pour obtenir le grade de docteurès sciences mathématiques — 1re thèse: Recherches
sur la théorie de la démonstration — 2me thèse: Propositions données par la faculté,
Les équations de Fredholm — Soutenues le 1930 devant la commission d’examen —
Président: M. Vessiot, Examinateurs: MM. Denjoy, Frechet — Vu et approuvé,
Paris, le 20 Juin 1929, Le doyen de la faculté des Sciences, C. Maurain — Vu et permis
d’imprimer, Paris, le 20 Juin 1929, Le recteur de l’Academie de Paris, S. Charlety
— No. d’ordre 2121, SérieA, No. de Série 1252 — Imprimerie J. Dziewulski, Varsovie —
Univ. de Paris. Also in Prace Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego, Wydział III
Nauk Matematyczno-Fizychnych, Nr. 33, Warszawa. A contorted, newly typeset reprint
is [Herbrand, 1968, pp. 35–153]. Annotated English translation Investigations in Proof
Theory by Warren Goldfarb (Chapters 1–4) and Burton Dreben and Jean van
Heijenoort (Chapter 5) with a brief introduction by Goldfarb and extended notes
by Goldfarb (NotesA–C, K–M, O), Dreben (NotesF–I), Dreben and Goldfarb
(Notes D, J, and N), andDreben,George Huff, andTheodore Hailperin (NoteE)
in [Herbrand, 1971, pp. 44–202]. English translation of § 5 with a different introduction
by Heijenoort and some additional extended notes by Dreben also in [Heijenoort,
1971a, pp. 525–581]. (Herbrand’s PhD thesis, his cardinal work, dated April 14, 1929;
submitted at the Univ. of Paris; defended at the Sorbonne June 11, 1930; printed in
Warsaw, 1930.)
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[Herbrand, 1930a] Jacques Herbrand. Les bases de la logique hilbertienne. Revue de
Métaphysique et de Morale, 37:243–255, 1930. Also in [Herbrand, 1968, pp. 155–166].
Annotated English translation The Principles of Hilbert’s Logic in [Herbrand, 1971,
pp. 203–214]. (Herbrand’s personal view on meta-mathematics and Hilbert’s pro-
gram).
[Herbrand, 1930b] Jacques Herbrand. Détermination des groupes de ramification d’un
corps à partir de ceux d’un sur-corps. Comptes rendus hebdomadaires des séances de
l’Académie des Sciences (Paris), 191:980–982, 1930.
[Herbrand, 1930c] Jacques Herbrand. Nouvelle démonstration et généralisation d’un
théorème de Minkowski. Comptes rendus hebdomadaires des séances de l’Académie des
Sciences (Paris), 191:1282–1285, 1930.
[Herbrand, 1931] Jacques Herbrand. Sur le problème fondamental de la logique mathé-
matique. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 24:12–56, 1931. Also in [Herbrand, 1968,
pp. 167–207]. Annotated English translation On the Fundamental Problem of Mathema-
tical Logic in [Herbrand, 1971, pp. 215–271].
[Herbrand, 1931a] Jacques Herbrand. Note non signeé sur [Herbrand, 1930]. An-
nales de l’Université de Paris, 6:186–189, 1931. Also in [Herbrand, 1968, pp. 209–214].
English translation Unsigned Note on Herbrand’s Thesis written by Herbrand him-
self in [Herbrand, 1971, pp. 272–276]. (The philosophy of metamathematics in the
Hilbert school (roughly following [Hilbert, 1928]) and the positioning of [Herbrand,
1930] in it are sketched for non-experts).
[Herbrand, 1931b] Inconsistent label replaced with [Herbrand, 1931d] or [Herbrand,
1932a].
[Herbrand, 1931c] Inconsistent label replaced with [Herbrand, 1932a].
[Herbrand, 1931d] Jacques Herbrand. Notice pour Jacques Hadamard. 1931. In
[Herbrand, 1968, pp. 215–219]. With annotations and a brief introduction by Jean van
Heijenoort. English translation Note for Jacques Hadamard by Warren Gold-
farb in [Herbrand, 1971, pp. 277–281]. (Abstracts for non-experts of Herbrand’s
mathematical contributions addressed to his presenter to the Academy of Sciences).
[Herbrand, 1931e] Jacques Herbrand. Sur les unités d’un corps algébrique. Comptes
rendus hebdomadaires des séances de l’Académie des Sciences (Paris), 192:24–27+188,
1931.
[Herbrand, 1931f] Jacques Herbrand. Sur la théorie des corps de nombres de degré infini.
Comptes rendus hebdomadaires des séances de l’Académie des Sciences (Paris), 193:504–
506, 1931. (Abstract of [Herbrand, 1932d; 1933]).
[Herbrand, 1931g] Jacques Herbrand. Sur la théorie des groupes de décomposition,
d’inertie et de ramication. J. de Math. Pures et Appliquées (J. Liouville), 9:481–498,
1931.
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[Herbrand, 1932a] Jacques Herbrand. Sur la non-contradiction de l’Arithmetique. J.
für die reine und angewandte Mathematik (Crellesches J.), 166:1–8, 1932. Received
July 27, 1931. Without Hasse’s obituary also in [Herbrand, 1968, pp. 221–232]. An-
notated English translation On the Consistency of Arithmetic in [Heijenoort, 1971a,
pp. 618–628]. Annotated English translation also in [Herbrand, 1971], pp. 282–298.
(Consistency of arithmetic, foreshadowing of (total) recursive functions, discussion of
[Gödel, 1931]).
[Herbrand, 1932b] Jacques Herbrand. Sur les classes des corps circulaires. J. de Math.
Pures et Appliquées (J. Liouville), 9:417–441, 1932.
[Herbrand, 1932c] Jacques Herbrand. Sur les théorèmes du genre principal et des idéaux
principaux. Abhandlungen aus dem mathematischen Seminar der Univ. Hamburg, 9:84–
92, 1932.
[Herbrand, 1932d] Jacques Herbrand. Théorie arithmétique des corps de nombres de
degré infini — I. Extensions algébriques finies de corps infinis. Mathematische Annalen,
106:473–501, 1932.
[Herbrand, 1932e] Jacques Herbrand. Une propriété du discriminant des corps al-
gébriques. Annales Scientifiques d l’École Normale Supérieure, Série 3, 49:105–112, 1932.
[Herbrand, 1932f] Jacques Herbrand. Zur Theorie der algebraischen Funktionen. Mathe-
matische Annalen, 106:502, 1932. From letters to Emmy Noether. Received Dec. 23,
1931.
[Herbrand, 1933] Jacques Herbrand. Théorie arithmétique des corps de nombres de degré
infini — II. Extensions algébriques de degré infini. Mathematische Annalen, 108:699–717,
1933. Ed. and with a last paragraph by Claude Chevalley.
[Herbrand, 1936] Jacques Herbrand. Le Développement Moderne de la Théorie des Corps
Algébriques — Corps de classes et lois de réciprocité. Mémorial des Sciences Mathéma-
tiques, Fascicule LXXV. Gauthier-Villars, Paris, 1936. Ed. and with an appendix by
Claude Chevalley.
[Herbrand, 1968] Jacques Herbrand. Écrits Logiques. Presses Universitaires de France,
Paris, 1968. Contorted edn. of Herbrand’s logical writings by Jean van Heijenoort.
English translation is [Herbrand, 1971].
[Herbrand, 1971] Jacques Herbrand. Logical Writings. Harvard Univ. Press, 1971. Ed. by
Warren Goldfarb. English Translation of [Herbrand, 1968] with additional annota-
tions, brief introductions, and extended notes by Goldfarb, Burton Dreben, and
Jean van Heijenoort. (This edition is still an excellent source on Herbrand’s writ-
ings today, but it is problematic because it is based on the contorted reprint [Herbrand,
1968]. This means that it urgently needs a corrected edition based on the original editions
of Herbrand’s logical writings, which are all in French and which should be included
in facsimile to avoid future contortion.).
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Figure 3: Photo of Jacques Herbrand by Emil Artin.
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Figure 4: Photo of Jacques Herbrand, probably by Emil Artin.
